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INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause cannot be reduced to a single
principle. But if it could-if there is a single premise that has
animated the Supreme Court's approach over the past fifty
years-it would be the neutrality principle. Government must
be neutral toward religion, and cannot endorse it over potential
alternatives. To this rule, there is but one official exception-
legislative prayer. This exception came in 1983, in the Supreme
Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers, where the Court upheld
the chaplaincy of Nebraska's state legislature.' In Marsh, for
the first and only time, government was given unambiguous
judicial sanction to speak religiously.2
Both before and after Marsh, and probably in part because
of it, there has been a steady push on the Court either to create
more exceptions to the neutrality principle or to simply aban-
don it altogether. The Court's recent struggles with "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance and with government-
sponsored Ten Commandments displays are but the most re-
cent examples.3 A reoccurring argument in these cases-and
one that runs through Marsh itself-is that modest deviations
from the neutrality principle make a great deal of political
sense. 4 Better to let mild religious endorsements stand, so the
argument goes, especially in light of the backlash that would
follow from striking them down. This sort of argument has been
advanced in various places by the most thoughtful and distin-
guished voices in constitutional scholarship, including Judge
Richard Posner,5 Steven Smith,6 Noah Feldman,7 Richard
1. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983).
2. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text (defending the claim
that Marsh is, in this way, unique).
3. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1 (2004).
4. See infra notes 60-62.
5. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).
6. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
7. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005).
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Schragger,8 Eugene Volokh, 9 Rick Garnett,' 0 and perhaps most
surprisingly, Justice Breyer." And their argument has undeni-
able force. After all, where exactly is the real harm in allowing
the government to speak religiously? How can things like a
town holiday display or a public school graduation prayer ever
be a genuine threat to religious liberty?
To these questions, a partial answer may be emerging in
the remarkable story of legislative prayer. For it is now twenty-
five years since Marsh was decided. And with a generation's
worth of hindsight, we can begin to see clearly what can hap-
pen when government is authorized to speak religiously. In a
strange way, Marsh has presented us with a unique opportuni-
ty. We now have a small window through which we can see
what religious liberty would look like if the neutrality principle
were to fade and mild religious endorsements like legislative
prayer were to proliferate.
What can be seen through that window, however, does not
look good. In the last twenty-five years, legislative prayer con-
troversies have become a part of American culture. With
Marsh's approval, legislative prayer has grown into a fissure
that now divides county boards, state legislatures, and city
councils across the country.12 Some of these disputes have
8. See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004).
9. See Posting of Eugene Volokh, volokh@law.ucla.edu, to religion-
law@lists.ucla.edu (July 25, 2008, 11:16:14 PDT), available at http://lists.ucla
.edulpipermail/religionlaw/2008-July/023483.html.
10. See Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Enforcement of the Establishment
Clause, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 273 (2008).
11. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698-706 (2005) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (providing the fifth vote).
12. See, e.g., Rebecca Bakken, Opening With Prayer: Area Municipalities
Vary in Their Decisions About Invocations, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, Dec. 14,
2008, http://www.mlive/news/kzgazette/index.ssf?/base/news-31/122923201628
600.xml&col1=7, available at 2008 WLNR 23966116; City Council Prayer
Should Seek to Include, VA.-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Aug. 8, 2009, at 6, availa-
ble at 2009 WLNR 15366990; Justin Faulconer, Praying in Virginia: Legal De-
bate Intensifies, NEWS & ADVANCE (Lynchburg, Va.), Feb. 8, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 2548554; Mary Giunca, Prayer Lawsuit May Be Coming to End,
WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 25, 2009, http://www2.journalnow.com/content/2009/
mar/25/prayer-lawsuit-may-be-coming-to-end/, available at 2009 WLNR
5576861; Rob Johnson & Mason Adams, Prayer at Roanoke City Council: Once
Again in Jesus' Name: Roanoke's First City Council Meeting of 2009 Begins
with Another Overtly Christian Prayer, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan.
6, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 252619; Nick G. Maheras, Prayer Fight May
Head for Round 2, HIGH POINT ENTERPRISE (N.C.), Oct. 19, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 19896932; Anita Miller, ACLU Allegations About Council Prayers
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changed the course of elections;13 others have led to violence. 14
Litigation has, unsurprisingly, become an omnipresent threat
and a frequent reality. 15 Legislative prayer is, obviously, a
Bring Sharp Responses, SAN MARCOS DAILY RECORD, July 12, 2009, http://
www.sanmarcosrecord.com/archivesearch/localstory_193111710.html, avail-
able at 2009 WLNR 13277669; Roger Phillips, Lodi Prayer Battle Draws in
Others, REC. (Stockton, Cal.), Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.recordnet.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090804/A News/908040313, available at 2009 WLNR
15043536; Elizabeth Stull, Prayer's Day In Court: Town of Greece Will Defend
Prayer Policy in Federal Court, DAILY REC. (Rochester, N.Y.), Aug. 13, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 15905924; Amy Flowers Umble, Public Prayer Still
Raises Issues, FREE LANCE-STAR (Fredericksburg), Jan. 24, 2009, http://
www.Fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2009/012009/01242009/440915, available
at 2009 WLNR 1422683; Pam Zubeck & Perry Swanson, Springs City Council:
We'll Keep Praying, THE GAZETTE (Co. Springs, Co.), July 21, 2008, http://www
.gazette.comlarticles/meetings-384538council-prayers.html, available at 2008
WLNR 13570724; Laura Ingraham, Controversy Over Mayor's Decision to
Cancel Prayer at City Council Meetings, Fox NEWS, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www
.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/0,3566,408045,00.html, available at 2008
WLNR 15747503.
13. See Nick G. Maheras, Prayer Issue Revisited, HIGH POINT ENTERPRISE
(N.C), Oct. 30, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20700493 ("Area Christian mi-
nisters met Monday to discuss the High Point City Council prayer issue and
Tuesday's upcoming election."); Tom Steadman, Council Votes on Prayer,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 17, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR
13681870 (explaining that after a nine to one vote to allow only nonsectarian
prayers, one minister "critical of the council vote, ended his comments with a
political threat .... 'We're going to remember in 2008,"' which was followed by
a "loud standing ovation"); Sherry Youngquist, Issues Led to Defeat of Yadkin
Officials, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 11, 2008, http://www2.journalnow.com/
content/2008/may/11/issues-led-to-defeat-of-yadkin-officials/, available at 2008
WLNR 8869993 ("Yadkin voters booted out incumbent commissioners Kim
Clark Phillips and Joel Cornelius in the Republican primary last week as part
of a backlash over the board's decision to drop sectarian prayer from meetings,
residents said.").
14. See Denyse Clark, High Priestess Took Chester County Town to Court,
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Aug. 16, 2005, at 1B, available at 2005 WLNR
12874908 (describing how one legislative prayer plaintiff returned home to
find her house broken into, her parrot beheaded, its heart cut out, and a note
left behind that read, "You're next!"); Robert Patrick & Laura Green, Rosenau-
ers' Home, Truck Vandalized: The Jewish Family Suing the Manatee County
School Board Over a Prayer Issue Calls Friday's Attack a Hate Crime, SARA-
SOTA HERALD-TRIB., Apr. 13, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 2979228.
15. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008); Turner
v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008); Hinrichs v.
Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005); Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292,
298-99 (4th Cir. 2004); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist., 52 F. App'x 355
(9th Cir. 2002); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Edue., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999);
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Joyner
v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2009);
Dobrich v. Walls, 380 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Del. 2005); Rubin v. City of Bur-
bank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 868 (Ct. App. 2002); see also Complaint at 1, Gal-
2010] 975
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
quite narrow field of law. But in the last decade, perhaps no
other Establishment Clause topic has seen as much litigation.
Consider some of the recent battles, which illustrate well
the issues involved. In South Carolina, the town council of the
city of Great Falls regularly opens its sessions with identifiably
Christian prayer.16 A woman tries to avoid the prayer by show-
ing up late to the meetings, is harassed for doing so by council
members, and brings suit to end the council's prayer practice.' 7
In Virginia, the Fredericksburg City Council adopts a policy
where all legislative prayers must be nondenominational, and
is sued by one of its own council members who feels religiously
committed to referring to Jesus Christ in his prayers.'8 Else-
where in Virginia, a resident tries to get on the list to offer
prayers before the Chesterfield County Board of Commission-
ers, but receives a letter in the mail denying her the opportuni-
ty because she is a Wiccan.19 In Indiana, pandemonium ensues
when, on the floor of the state legislature, a member of the
clergy who was invited to give a prayer breaks out into the
song, "Just a Little Walk with Jesus."20 In Utah, outcries erupt
when, at a Murray City Council meeting, a citizen seeks to offer
a prayer that begins, "Our Mother, who art in heaven (if, in-
deed there is a heaven and if there is a god that takes a wom-
an's form), hallowed be thy name."2 1 These disputes offer some-
thing to offend people of all political ideologies and all religious
denominations; there is enough here to gore everyone's ox.
Lower courts have struggled with these cases. The Su-
preme Court in Marsh focused principally on the first-order
question-whether or not legislative prayer was intrinsically
loway v. Town of Greece, No. 6:08cv06088 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2008); Joint Mo-
tion for Entry of Order Approving Settlement & Entering Consent Decree, in
Rosenauer v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee County, No. 8:04cv0018 (M.D. Fla. May 20,
2004).
One public interest group that litigates these issues reports that they
have resolved, without litigation, numerous such disputes brought to their at-
tention in the last five years. See AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF
CHURCH & STATE, NONLITIGATION ADVOcACY SUMMARY (2010), http://www.au
.org/internal/legal/non-litigation-report.html.
16. See Wynne, 376 F.3d at 294.
17. See id. at 295.
18. See Turner, 534 F.3d at 353-54.
19. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279-80.
20. See Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 395.




constitutional. 22 The Court said little about the second-order
questions-that is, whether and to what extent constitutional
principles would still constrain the actual operation of legisla-
tive prayer. Left largely to developing their own jurisprudence,
lower courts have deeply split on these questions, and eventual-
ly the Supreme Court will have to step in to address them.
This Article addresses this second generation of legislative
prayer cases. It has two purposes, one doctrinal and one theo-
retical. On the doctrinal side, it examines the constitutional li-
mitations that lower courts have placed on legislative prayer.
These usually come in two types. First, courts have imposed
limitations on the content of legislative prayers-sometimes
requiring, for example, that legislative prayers be thoroughly
nondenominational or "nonsectarian."23 Second, courts have
imposed limitations on the selection of prayergivers-
sometimes prohibiting, for example, the government from pick-
ing and choosing prayergivers based on their religious affilia-
tions.24 Both requirements make some sense. They each flow
naturally from the Supreme Court's iron prohibition on deno-
minational discrimination, and at first glance seem sensible
protections for religious liberty within the sphere of legislative
prayer.
Yet they both also have serious and intractable downsides.
There are admittedly some problems with things like line draw-
ing. But more troubling are the costs imposed on religious li-
berty. For what these restrictions give to religious freedom with
one hand, they take from religious freedom with the other. In-
sisting that prayer be nondenominational, for example, protects
listeners from denominationally exclusive speech. But it con-
comitantly requires discrimination against speakers who insist
on praying in denominational terms. Protecting one group by
necessity requires leaving the other defenseless. Religious li-
berty, within the sphere of legislative prayer, thus becomes a
perverse sort of zero-sum game-no matter how it is done,
someone's religious liberty will inevitably be lost as a conse-
quence. The only way to really protect religious liberty, it
seems, is by not having legislative prayer at all.
And this realization brings us to the larger and more theo-
retical ambition of this Article. These legislative prayer dis-
22. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783-92 (1983) (discussing
whether the practice of legislative prayer was generally constitutional).
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part III.
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putes do not just say something about legislative prayer. In-
stead, they provide a unique insight into the inherent dangers
of religious endorsements, and a general warning about the fu-
ture of the Establishment Clause. For fifty years, the Court has
generally barred government from endorsing religion. But re-
cently that principle has come under serious attack. Even more
liberal Justices, like Justice Breyer, now seem inclined to ac-
cept minor religious endorsements as mostly harmless accom-
modations of majoritarianism, 25 even as justly prominent scho-
lars, liberal and conservative alike, encourage the Court down
this path.26
The overarching lesson of these legislative prayer cases is
that these ostensibly harmless endorsements have a way of be-
coming not so harmless at all. When the government speaks re-
ligiously, it becomes committed to making a continual set of
discretionary religious choices. This invites conflict; in the con-
text of legislative prayer, it means battles over who will have
the right to pray and what they will get to say. Government
now must decide fundamental issues of religious truth-it must
decide the proper type of religious message and the proper type
of person to deliver it. Different communities will decide these
issues differently. Diverse ones will tend to embrace religious
ecumenism and reject religious exclusivity; homogenous ones
will tend to do the opposite. But in both cases someone will
have to be rejected. Everyone intuitively understands the costs
legislative prayer puts on atheists and agnostics. 27 But the sur-
prising thing has been the costs of legislative prayer on reli-
gious believers, on both the left and the right, who are suddenly
25. Justice Breyer surprised many recently when he voted to uphold a
Ten Commandments display. The display might be divisive but the more divi-
sive thing, Breyer suggested, would have been for the Court to strike it down.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (pro-
viding the fifth vote and arguing that striking down the Ten Commandments
display in question would "create the very kind of religiously based divisive-
ness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid").
26. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Mired in the Marsv Legislative Prayers, Mo-
ments of Silence and the Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIAN L. REV. 713, 730
(2009) (explaining how legislative prayer "tells atheists that their beliefs don't
count and aren't worthy of being expressed at government occasions"); cf.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("It seems incredible to suggest that the
average observer of legislative prayer who either believes in no religion or
whose faith rejects the concept of God would not receive the clear message
that his faith is out of step with the political norm.").
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surprised to find that their religion is not what the government
wants.
Putting constitutional restrictions on legislative prayer
may reduce these harms by narrowing the scope of the govern-
ment's religious choices. But it cannot eliminate them. As long
as legislative prayer is constitutionally permissible-as long as
Marsh lives-these fights over legislative prayer will continue,
as will the distress that gives rise to them. Of course, had
Marsh been decided the other way, both the disputes and the
distress would not be happening. There would have been other
problems, to be sure. Many people would have been angered at
the Supreme Court; perhaps that anger would have spilled out
to create other types of religious conflict. Ultimately, of course,
no one can really say with certainty which route would have
best minimized religious division. But what one can say with
certainty is that the Supreme Court's approval of legislative
prayer has turned out to be more threatening to religious liber-
ty than was apparent at the time. Marsh chose the route that
seemed most expedient-the route that offered the least poten-
tial for immediate controversy. Yet twenty-five years later, as
the battles over legislative prayer still rage, that route seems
more and more a misadventure. For those who think that mild
religious endorsements are harmless, the history of legislative
prayer offers a somewhat sobering response.
In the coming years, the Roberts Court will have to consid-
er whether to allow the government more latitude to send reli-
gious messages and put up religious symbols. 28 There will be
hard decisions as to whether to adhere to the neutrality prin-
ciple, and if not, how far to depart from it. These legislative
prayer cases offer the best glimpse of where such decisions
might lead. Should the Roberts Court wish to know where a re-
jection of the neutrality principle now could lead to in a genera-
tion, it need look no further than the status of legislative
prayer today. Twenty-five years worth of hindsight suggest
that giving government latitude to speak religiously comes with
extensive social costs that are initially difficult to foresee-
costs that will be borne by people of all political and religious
persuasions.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I addresses Marsh
v. Chambers, and explains how it has led to the current dis-
putes over legislative prayer. Parts II, III, and IV turn to the
28. See, e.g., Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
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second generation of legislative prayer cases. These Parts ex-
plain the constitutional issues that Marsh has left open and the
virtues and vices of the alternative positions, ultimately con-
cluding that it is impossible to provide for religious liberty
within the world of legislative prayer. Part V connects legisla-
tive prayer to the larger debate about the Establishment
Clause, using legislative prayer as a case study to examine the
hidden perils of apparently benign religious endorsements.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND LEGISLATIVE
PRAYER
A. MARSH AND ITS HISTORY
It was in 1983, in Marsh v. Chambers, that the issue of leg-
islative prayer finally reached the Supreme Court. 29 The pre-
cise issue was the constitutionality of Nebraska's practice of
having a hired chaplain offer prayers at the beginning of legis-
lative sessions. But understanding the constitutional issue in
Marsh requires some context.
At the time of Marsh, the Supreme Court had, in word and
deed, long adhered to the neutrality principle-the idea that
the government could not prefer religion over its alternatives.
This theory was more far-reaching than its modern competi-
tors, such as noncoercionism and nonpreferentialism. 30 Under
29. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
30. See Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another
False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 39 (1991).
As for noncoercionism and nonpreferentialism, their names somewhat suggest
their meanings. Under noncoercionism, government cannot coerce or punish
religious belief, but it can try to persuade its citizens on religious matters. Un-
der nonpreferentialism, government cannot favor one religion over another,
but it can favor religion generally over nonbelief. These two theories overlap,
but have different centers. Requiring citizens to attend worship at a religious
institution of their choice, for example, would be consistent with nonpreferen-
tialism but not noncoercionism. Allowing the government to put up crbches at
Christmas, as another example, would be consistent with noncoercionism but
not nonpreferentialism. For more discussion of these two theories, see id. at
39-41.
There is also a restrictive hybrid of noncoercionism and nonpreferential-
ism, known as nonsectarianism. Under nonsectarianism, government can only
encourage religious belief; it can never coerce or punish. And the government
cannot encourage religion of a particular stripe; it can only encourage religion
generally over nonbelief. Nonsectarianism also now acts as a label given to
government speech (which is by its nature usually noncoercive) that is nonpre-
ferential. See id. at 39-41 (discussing noncoercionism and nonpreferentialism




it, government could not show the slightest favoritism for reli-
gion. The Court first laid out the neutrality principle in Ever-
son v. Board of Education,31 where the Court explained it like
this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Nei-
ther can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to
go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. 32
Over the subsequent decades, the Court repeatedly reaf-
firmed this statement. The Court's opinions were littered with
various rephrasings of the general principle. The government
had to be neutral "between religion and nonreligion."33 It could
not "persuade or force" opinion on religious matters, 34 as the
First Amendment was designed "to take every form of propaga-
tion of religion out of the realm of . .. public business."35 The
government had to "be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and nonbelievers,"3 6 and therefore could not
"aid all religions as against nonbelievers."37 The Court perhaps
put the point most elaborately in Epperson v. Arkansas:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hos-
tile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it may not
aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another
or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment man-
dates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and be-
tween religion and nonreligion.38
Virtually every Justice agreed with these broad statements
of neutrality, even as they differed in applying that principle to
particular cases. By the time of Marsh, every member of the
Court had agreed to some rephrasing of the neutrality prin-
ciple, with the sole exception of Justice Rehnquist. 39 And the
Supreme Court's commitment to this principle was not merely
in words. The Court had repeatedly applied it, constitutionally
31. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
33. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1971) (quoting Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968)).
34. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952).
35. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963)
(quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 18).
36. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
37. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
38. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04.




barring the government from doing such things as offering
prayers, 40 claiming that certain religious views were true,41
putting up religious displays, 42 or conditioning political benefits
on religious belief.43
From the perspective of the neutrality principle, the legis-
lative chaplaincy at issue in Marsh seemed clearly unconstitu-
tional. Legislative chaplaincies involved the sort of favoritism
for religion that the neutrality principle had always con-
demned-the chaplaincies were "official, institutional, clerical,
paid, statutorily authorized, continuously operating, longstand-
ing, and undeniably religious."44 On this issue no one really
disagreed; applying the neutrality principle forthrightly meant
striking down the chaplaincies.
But there was, of course, another side to the story. Legisla-
tive chaplaincies, in both the states and in the federal govern-
ment, were long-established institutions. The history behind
legislative prayer extended back to even before the Constitu-
tion.45 Of course, there had always been some doubts about the
constitutionality of legislative prayer 46-and an occasional
40. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that it violated
the Establishment Clause for a state school to encourage students to partici-
pate in a daily classroom invocation).
41. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107 (striking down an Arkansas statute
prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the public schools); Sch. Dist. of Abing-
ton Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (holding that it violated the Es-
tablishment Clause for state schools to read students passages from the Bible).
42. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (striking down a Ken-
tucky statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
school classrooms).
43. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (striking down a
Maryland oath that required notaries to declare a belief in God).
44. See Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171, 1172-73 (2009).
45. Id. at 1177-82 (discussing the origins of legislative prayer in the Con-
tinental Congress in 1774).
46. In his Detached Memoranda, James Madison argued against the con-
stitutionality of the chaplaincies. See Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's "Detached
Memoranda," 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558-59 (1946); see also Andy G. Olree,
James Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 159-60
(2008). Congress also considered the constitutional issue several times in the
1850s in various reports, although each report concluded that the chaplaincies
were constitutional. See H.R. REP. NO. 33-124, at 6, 8 (1854); S. REP. NO. 32-
376, at 1-4 (1853); H.R. REP. NO. 31-171, at 3 (1850). For more on Madison's
and Congress's objections, see Lund, supra note 44, at 1186-87, 1196-1202.
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challenge to it 47-but after two centuries, it seemed as if such
doubts had dried up. Indeed, the Court had itself repeatedly in-
timated that the chaplaincies were constitutional. In 1952, in
the early case of Zorach v. Clauson,48 the Court referred to
"[p]rayers in our legislative halls" as the sort of nominal sup-
port for religion that would be constitutionally acceptable. 49
Justice Brennan himself indicated the same a decade later,
when he claimed that "invocational prayers in legislative
chambers, state or federal, and the appointment of legislative
chaplains, might well represent no involvements of the kind
prohibited by the Establishment Clause."50 There was thus un-
deniable dissonance between the Court's stated principles and
the practices that it had long condoned. 51
And who knows how long the Supreme Court would have
been able to postpone dealing with the contrast between prin-
ciple and practice, had it not been for the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion to strike down Nebraska's legislative chaplaincy. 52 The
Court now found itself unavoidably thrust into the debate, and
with a difficult choice to make. It could strike down the chap-
laincies, which would generate tremendous religious and politi-
cal controversy. Or it could uphold them, thus officially back-
tracking on the neutrality principle. This was, in all relevant
respects, the same dilemma that the Court would face a gener-
ation later, when the Ninth Circuit ordered "under God" out of
47. See, e.g., Elliott v. White, 23 F.2d 997, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (dismiss-
ing, on standing grounds, an Establishment Clause challenge to the congres-
sional chaplaincies).
48. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952).
49. Id. at 312-13. The first case to mention the tradition of legislative
prayer was Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892),
where the Court referred to "the custom of opening sessions of all deliberative
bodies and most conventions with prayer." Id.
50. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
51. At this point, the Court had not yet considered other similar issues,
such as the proclamation "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court" opening the business of the federal courts, or the religious Thanksgiv-
ing proclamations issued by Presidents in office, or the phrase "under God"
added to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954, see Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No.
83-396, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)), or
the phrase "in God we Trust" put on the coin in 1864, see 3 ANSON PHELPS
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 602 (1950).




the Pledge of Allegiance. 53 In Marsh, as was later the case in
Newdow, constitutional principle was squarely opposed to polit-
ical reality. In Marsh, as in Newdow, it was "politically imposs-
ible to affirm and legally impossible to reverse."54 In Marsh, as
in Newdow, the immovable object had met the irresistible force.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court chose to uphold the chap-
laincies, writing the opinion as a straightforward application of
what it considered to be undisputed history.55 Given the long
history of legislative prayer, and given that the First Congress
had explicitly authorized it within a few days of approving the
Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Burger concluded that
"the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did
not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a vi-
olation of that Amendment."56 That was essentially the end of
the opinion.57 The majority opinion did not cite Engel v. Vitale,
the only other case the Court had ever decided that dealt with
government-sponsored prayer.5 8 Nor did it mention the then-
dominant three-part doctrinal test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 9
Marsh's particular historical approach made all these cases,
and the neutrality principle itself, utterly irrelevant.
Deciding Marsh this way, of course, avoided all the politi-
cal and religious controversy that might well have followed
from a decision striking the chaplaincies down. The Court sure-
ly understood this point. When the Court called the chaplain-
cies "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
53. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other
grounds sub. nom., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
54. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 155, 224 (2004) (referring to Newdow).
55. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (describing the history
as "unambiguous and unbroken"). But see Lund, supra note 44, at 1207-13
(arguing that Marsh's historical analysis was somewhat oversimplified).
56. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788.
57. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362 (1988) ("The interesting thing about the opinion is
that it is based squarely and exclusively on the historical fact that the framers
of the first amendment did not believe legislative chaplains to violate the es-
tablishment clause.").
58. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962).
59. Justice Brennan pointed this out in his dissent. See Marsh, 463 U.S.
at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971)) ("The Court makes no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's practice of leg-
islative prayer to any of the formal 'tests' that have traditionally structured
our inquiry under the Establishment Clause.").
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among the people of this country,"60 it left an unmistakable im-
pression-namely that part of what was making the chaplain-
cies so tolerable to the Court was precisely the fact that the
support for them was widely held. 61 This also accords with
what we know of the author of the opinion in Marsh, Chief Jus-
tice Burger. A decade earlier, Burger wrote Lemon v.
Kurtzman, where the Court first conceptualized the avoidance
of disagreement as a primary Establishment Clause value.62
"[P]olitical division along religious lines," Burger said, "was one
of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect."63 Sentiments of that sort surely prodded
the Court toward accepting the chaplaincies, though it is no
doubt impossible to calculate their true influence.
There were, of course, criticisms of Marsh both on and off
the Court. The two dissents focused on different points. Justice
Brennan argued that the chaplaincies were intrinsically un-
constitutional, while Justice Stevens argued that the chaplain-
cies would inevitably disadvantage religious minorities, and
thus were unconstitutional in their operation. 64 Other commen-
tators added their critiques. 65 But the continuing problem with
the chaplaincies, however, has been their deep incompatibility
with constitutional principle. The history behind legislative
60. Id. at 792 (majority opinion).
61. Justice Scalia understands Marsh this way as well. He once quoted
the passage as evidence that the Marsh Court was considering potential politi-
cal reaction in its decision to uphold the chaplaincies. See McCreary County v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 900 n.8 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Nothing so
clearly demonstrates the utter inconsistency of our Establishment Clause jur-
isprudence as Justice O'Connor's stirring concurrence in the present case. 'We
do not,' she says, 'count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.' But
Justice O'Connor joined the opinion of the Court in Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, (1983), which held legislative prayer to be 'a tolerable acknowledg-
ment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."' (citations and
quotations omitted)).
62. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
63. Id. For a thorough analysis of this claim, and how it has changed over
time, see generally Richard Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amend-
ment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006).
64. Compare Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795-822 & nn. 1-54 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) with id. at 822-24 & nn. 1-2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 14-15, at 1288-89 (2d ed. 1988) (describing Marsh as a "seemingly anomal-
ous" case); Leslie C. Griffin, No Law Respecting the Practice of Religion, 85 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 475, 479 (2008) ('There should be no historical exception
to the rule that government should not become involved in religious prac-
tice."); McConnell, supra note 57, at 362 ("I believe that Marsh v. Chambers
represents original intent subverting the principle of the rule of law.").
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prayer in this country certainly does not square with the neu-
trality principle, to be sure. But the real problem is that legis-
lative prayer does not square with any principled conception of
the Establishment Clause. Religious worship conducted by gov-
ernment-paid clergy bears important hallmarks of the old es-
tablished churches; the two differ greatly in magnitude, of
course, but not much in principle. So it is hard to find any
theory of the Establishment Clause that is compatible with the
history of legislative prayer in this country. A noncoercion
theory cannot do it. After all, chaplains have been paid with
money taken from taxpayers, and taxation is certainly coer-
cive. 66 Nor can the history behind the chaplaincies be explained
with a nonpreferentialist theory (such as the one that Justice
Scalia has sometimes counseled). 67 For that would require leg-
islative prayers to have had nondenominational language and
legislative prayergivers to have been chosen on nondenomina-
tional grounds. Yet those requirements are modern creations-
as a matter of history, neither Nebraska's chaplaincy nor the
federal congressional chaplaincies were nonpreferential in this
sense.68 Indeed, even rejecting incorporation would not solve
the dilemma-the congressional chaplaincies were obviously
established by Congress, not by the states. Perhaps the only
66. See Laycock, supra note 30, at 40 ("[It is common ground that taxa-
tion is coercive."); see also Brief for the Respondent at 11, Marsh, 463 U.S. 783
(No. 82-83) ("[Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer] violat[es] the irreduci-
ble core of the Establishment Clause-that no tax in any amount may be used
to fund overtly religious activity."). For more on the ways in which taxation
was used to support the established churches at the time of the founding, see
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,
Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2146-59
(2003).
67. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
("[O]ur constitutional tradition, from the Declaration of Independence and the
first inaugural address of Washington, quoted earlier, down to the present
day, has, with a few aberrations ... ruled out of order government-sponsored
endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense
of specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent,
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example,
the divinity of Christ)."); see also McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S.
844, 909 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that government-sponsored
endorsements of religion are unconstitutional when they "prefer[] one reli-
gious sect over another").
68. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Cere-
monial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2104 (1996) ("[W]ithin the last six
years alone, over two hundred and fifty opening prayers delivered by congres-
sional chaplains have included supplications to Jesus Christ."). This is also a
theme in Lund, supra note 44.
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principled conception of the Establishment Clause that can le-
gitimize the chaplaincies is Justice Thomas's view that the Es-
tablishment Clause creates no individual rights.69 But that is
just a backhanded illustration of how difficult it is to offer a
principled conception of the Establishment Clause that would
uphold the chaplaincies. Justice Thomas's theory would require
a complete rewrite of Establishment Clause history; in his eyes,
there has been no Establishment Clause case ever brought
where the plaintiff should have won. 70 In this sense, the Fra-
mers' acceptance of legislative prayer seems deeply unprin-
cipled-not in the pejorative sense of being illegitimate or dis-
honorable, but in the objective sense of rejecting any
overarching philosophy.71 To borrow a phrase later used by
Thomas Berg, the chaplaincies are perhaps the best example of
Establishment Clause anti-theory.72
A generation later, Marsh now stands as one of the most
important Establishment Clause cases ever decided. In many
different contexts, the Supreme Court has barred government
from acting religiously and from favoring religion over its al-
ternatives.73 Marsh is the only exception-the only domain
where the government has license to speak religiously. One can
perhaps think of other examples, such as the Ten Command-
ments display approved in Van Orden, the Christmas tree and
menorah approved in Allegheny County, and the criche ap-
proved in Lynch.74 But those cases all differ in a fundamental
respect. The Supreme Court approved the displays in those
69. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ('The Establishment Clause does not purport to pro-
tect individual rights.").
70. See Laycock, supra note 54, at 240 ("[Justice Thomas] appears to be-
lieve that every decision in the Court's history giving any content to the Estab-
lishment Clause was also wrongly decided.").
71. That the historical practice of legislative prayer is unprincipled in this
sense does not make it unjust or even unconstitutional. We could cobble to-
gether an Establishment Clause jurisprudence using bits of history, precedent,
and common sense, without depending on any overarching principle. Of
course, some object to such an approach, and indeed Michael McConnell criti-
cized Marsh on this precise ground. McConnell, supra note 57, at 363
("[Unless I can be persuaded that there is some coherent understanding of the
establishment clause, which can be applied consistently in the circumstances
of today, I am forced to disagree with the holding in Marsh.").
72. See Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 693 (1997).
73. See infra notes 31-43 (providing examples).
74. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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cases on the theory that they were, at bottom, secular-or,
speaking inelegantly, at least more secular than religious.75
But the Supreme Court suggested no such thing in Marsh. The
Marsh court did not conclude that legislative prayer was not re-
ligious-it concluded that legislative prayer, though religious,
did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Now some, no doubt, will find this distinction thin, tech-
nical, and unpersuasive. But the Court certainly still maintains
it; it still sees Marsh as fundamentally different from its other
cases. A few years ago, for example, the Court offhandedly re-
ferred to legislative prayer as the sole "special instance [where
it] found good reason to hold governmental action legitimate
even where its manifest purpose was presumably religious."76
Lower courts have picked up on this as well. They often refer to
how "Marsh is one of a kind,"7 7 and have also clearly under-
stood that the usual "endorsement," "coercion," and "Lemon"
tests-which apply to all other Establishment Clause litiga-
tion-are inapposite when it comes to legislative prayer.78
75. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring)(providing the
fifth vote and upholding the government's display of the Ten Commandments,
on the grounds that the display "communicates not simply a religious mes-
sage, but a secular message as well" and that the "nonreligious aspects of the
tablets' message . . . predominate"); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 619
(upholding the government's display of a Christmas tree and a menorah, on
the grounds that it was "not an endorsement of religious faith but simply a
recognition of cultural diversity"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 (upholding the gov-
ernment's display of a creche, on the grounds that there were "legitimate secu-
lar purposes" behind the government's action).
76. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 n.10 (2005)(citing
only Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 40 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]nly in
the most extraordinary circumstances could actual worship or prayer be de-
fended [as constitutional]. . . . We have upheld only one such prayer against
Establishment Clause challenge, and it was supported by an extremely long
and unambiguous history." (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. 783)).
77. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999); see
also Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 211 (5th Cir. 2006);
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003); Newman v. City of East
Point, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
78. See, e.g., Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.
1998) ("[The evolution of Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicates that
the constitutionality of legislative prayers is a sui generis legal question.");
Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("[E]xisting legislative prayer practice, . . . fits into a special nook-a narrow
space tightly sealed off from otherwise applicable first amendment doctrine.").
Justice Brennan foresaw this in his Marsh dissent. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court is carving out an exception to the Es-




And regardless of this distinction's ultimate persuasive-
ness, it undoubtedly has had an impact on Establishment
Clause litigation. With regard to holiday displays and Ten
Commandments plaques, the government must vigilantly
maintain the fagade that its action is entirely secular. But with
legislative prayer, government can (and does) let slip the mask,
knowing that legislative prayer can be honestly and unambi-
guously religious while still falling within the safe harbor es-
tablished by Marsh. As we shall see, this has made legislative
prayer a unique domain where governments can openly develop
things like "prayer policies" and freely make religious decisions
and theological judgments. And, as we shall also see, this has
led to some uniquely disturbing incidents and uniquely vexing
problems. 79
B. MARSH AND ITS AMBIGUITIES
Marsh thus conclusively resolved the issue whether legis-
lative prayer was intrinsically unconstitutional (what we will
call the first-order question). But by answering that in the neg-
ative, the Court created for itself a variety of second-order
questions. The Court then had to lay out whether there were
circumstances under which legislative prayer, constitutional in
theory, might turn unconstitutional in practice. The important
point here is that Marsh did not simply wash its hands of legis-
lative prayer. Instead of turning legislative prayer over entirely
to the political process, Marsh approved legislative prayer with
two limitations.80 The first related to the content of legislative
prayer. At some point, according to Marsh, legislative prayer
could become so overly divisive and denominational that the
79. Marsh has also taken on unparalleled importance in one other respect.
Its status as the only official exception to the neutrality rule means that the
only salvation for clear endorsements of religion lies in Marsh itself. So
whether one is talking about the daily supper prayer at a military college, a
school board's practice of opening with a religious invocation, or prayer at the
President's inauguration, the question is always whether the religious activity
at issue is sufficiently like the legislative prayers approved in Marsh. See, e.g.,
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 369-70 (evaluating a daily supper prayer at Virginia Mili-
tary Institute); Coles, 171 F.3d at 380-83 (evaluating a school board meeting
prayer); Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 283-86 (D.D.C. 2005) (evaluat-
ing a prayer at the presidential inauguration).
80. By permitting the political branches to engage in legislative prayer,
while restricting them with various conditions on the exercise of that power,
Marsh in an important way maximized (though unintentionally) the future
role of the Court. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison:
Making Defeat Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13, 28-31
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (making the same point regarding Marbury).
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prayer experience would be unconstitutional. 81 The second re-
lated to the methods by which prayergivers were chosen. At
some point, according to Marsh, government's ability to pick
and choose prayergivers on the basis of their religious denomi-
nations would be limited.82
Much more will be said about these two requirements. But
one can see immediately that they provide somewhat comple-
mentary protections. One protects listeners, while the other
protects speakers. And both restrictions are essentially safe-
guards against religious preferentialism. The first protects lis-
teners from speech they find harassing because of its denomi-
national overtones; the second protects speakers from being
excluded because of their particular denominational affilia-
tions. But although the two restrictions seem to be mutually
reinforcing, the reality is not nearly so simple.
II. PROTECTING LISTENERS: THE NONSECTARIAN
REQUIREMENT
The most persistent of the second generation Marsh con-
troversies has been over the content of legislative prayers. The
facts of the individual cases vary somewhat, although common
themes abound. Certainly the most typical cases are the dis-
putes that arise over identifiably Christian prayers. In Pelph-
rey v. Cobb County, for example, the Cobb County Board of Su-
pervisors opened its sessions with prayers that typically used
Christian theological language-prayers would routinely end,
for example, "in Jesus' name we pray."8 3 But there are other
types of cases. Sometimes religious minorities take control of
the prayer opportunity in a way that the majority finds offen-
sive. In Snyder v. Murray City Corp., a plaintiff sought to open
the Murray City Council's meeting with a prayer that began,
"Our Mother, who art in heaven (if, indeed there is a heaven
and if there is a god that takes a woman's form) hallowed be
thy name."84
Now there is little dispute that Marsh imposes some sort of
content-based limitation on the content of legislative prayers.
Marsh itself said as much.85 And for quite good reason-
81. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792-95; see also infra Part II.
82. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792-95; see also infra Part III.
83. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008). For a
detailed analysis critical of Pelphrey, see Segall, supra note 27, at 713.
84. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1228 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998).
85. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783; see also infra notes 104-05.
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virtually everyone believes that the Establishment Clause for-
bids government from deliberately favoring one religion over
another. But while few doubt that overly denominational pray-
ers cross a constitutional line at some point, people debate in-
tensely over where that point is. Some courts have imposed a
rigorous "nonsectarian" requirement, mandating that each in-
dividual legislative prayer be scrupulously nondenomination-
al.8 6 Other courts have been more deferential, requiring only
that the legislative prayer process not be exploited in such a
way as to proselytize for one faith or to disparage some other
faith.87
This section examines the various standards, chiefly by ex-
amining the virtues and vices of the stricter nonsectarian re-
quirement. In some ways, a complete ban on denominational
references makes perfect sense; it would be the natural and
precise implementation of the Supreme Court's longstanding
ban on denominational discrimination. But it has its down-
sides, the largest being that it essentially discriminates against
prayergivers who would use denominational references. People
can reasonably disagree as to whether the benefits of a strict
ban outweigh the costs. But one reality should be apparent.
Neither option looks very good at all. And when all our poten-
tial paths forward are this unsatisfying-when we are forced to
choose between one form of denominational discrimination or
another-we naturally must wonder whether we are on wrong
course altogether.
A. THE NONSECTARIAN REQUIREMENT GENERALLY
We begin with some general discussion of the particulars of
nonsectarianism. As discussed earlier, nonsectarianism is the
restrictive hybrid of two other Establishment Clause theories-
noncoercionism and nonpreferentialism. 88 Under nonsectarian-
ism, government can only encourage religious belief, rather
than coerce it. And the only type of religion that government
can encourage is a general nondenominational one.
While the nonsectarian standard has had a pivotal role in
legislative prayer cases, it has also played a significant role in
Establishment Clause litigation more generally. From the very
beginning, nonsectarianism has been a competitor to the neu-
86. See Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004); Bacus v.
Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist., 52 F. App'x 355, 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
87. See, e.g., Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1271; Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1236.
88. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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trality principle. In one of the first school prayer cases, Engel v.
Vitale, the issue was New York's policy of opening the school
day with a prayer created by the New York Board of Regents.89
One of the reasons why the prayer was constitutional, New
York argued, was that it was nondenominational. It referred to
God generally, and did not go into any theological details that
might divide various monotheists.90 And actually the idea of
nonsectarianism actually goes further back than that-back in-
to the nineteenth century, when states and local governments
first addressed how the newly formed public schools would deal
with issues of religion.9'
In different times and in different contexts, the nonsecta-
rian standard resurfaces. Part of the reason it keeps coming
back is that it offers a somewhat attractive middle ground be-
tween having no government-sponsored religion at all, and giv-
ing the government complete discretion to say whatever it likes
about religion. The nonsectarian standard offers a compromise,
albeit of an unusual sort. The government can act religiously,
but not too religiously.
The extremes in our political culture find the nonsectarian
standard attractive mostly as a fallback. The left would rather
get rid of government-sponsored religion altogether. The right
would like government to be able to support either individual
religionS92 or narrow groups of religions,93 without having to
support religion in an entirely generic and general manner.
Each side thus advances the nonsectarian standard when tacti-
cally appropriate, as a way of avoiding a more complete loss.
Thus, in areas where the Supreme Court has prohibited gov-
89. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
90. See Brief of Respondents at 8, Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468), 1962 WL
115798 ("[Tihe challenged recitation was rightly upheld. It is not compulsory,
is clearly nonsectarian in language, and neither directly nor indirectly even
suggests belief in any form of organized or established religion.").
91. Trying to smooth over the differences between groups of Protestants,
school districts taught a generalized sort of Protestantism. This was eventual-
ly labeled the "nonsectarian" approach, because it was compatible with all the
various sects of Protestantism. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A
Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 299-300
(2001) (describing this approach and how it eventually led to nineteenth-
century conflicts between Protestants and Catholics).
92. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (involving a govern-
ment display of a city-owned nativity scene).
93. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579-87 (1989) (in-




ernment-sponsored religion (as with, for example, government-
sponsored prayer in the public schools), it is the conservative
side that argues for the nonsectarian standard. But in areas
where the Supreme Court has approved government-sponsored
religion (as with, for example, legislative prayer), it is the lib-
eral side that argues for the nonsectarian standard. Of course,
this does mean that both sides end up being somewhat incon-
sistent about the nonsectarian standard when the need arises.
Conservative groups praise the nonsectarian standard when
the issue is prayer in schools or certain religious displays, 94 but
then attack it in the context of legislative prayer. 95 Liberal
groups do the opposite, advancing the nonsectarian standard in
the context of legislative prayer,96 but then trying to undermine
it in other contexts.97
The nonsectarian standard thus functions largely as a
strategic device; neither side is committed to it as a matter of
principle. Indeed, the only ones that directly benefit from a
nonsectarian standard are those who both embrace govern-
ment-sponsored religion and whose views of the divine are
themselves nonsectarian. This is a very small crowd. Intense
religious believers often reject the nonsectarian standard, as it
sidelines those who would only pray in denominational terms.
And nonbelievers often reject it as well, seeing prayers to God
as being just as incompatible with atheism as prayers to Jesus
or Allah. 98 This again reinforces the tactical nature of the non-
94. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law & Justice in
Support of Respondents at 2-3 & n.1, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(No. 03-1500), 2005 WL 273648 (arguing that a Ten Commandments display
should be upheld, in part, because it is "non-sectarian").
95. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Center for Law & Justice in
Support of Defendants-Appellants at 12-16, Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch.
Bd., 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-30294), 2007 WL 2735333 ("[The
distinction between 'sectarian' and 'nonsectarian' [legislative prayer] is inhe-
rently in the eye of the beholder. . . . [P]ars[ing] the content of prayers to draw
a line between 'sectarian' and 'nonsectarian' would pose serious First Amend-
ment problems[, such as] 'an impermissible degree of entanglement."').
96. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Anti-Defamation League in Support of
Appellee John Doe at 21-27, Tangipahoah Parish, 494 F.3d 494 (No. 05-
30294), 2005 WL 5774135.
97. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Anti-Defamation League and Philip A.
Cunningham, Ph.D., Executive Director, Center for Christian-Jewish Learn-
ing at Boston College, in Support of Petitioner in No. 03-1500 and in Support
of Respondents in No. 03-1693 at 24, Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (No. 03-1500),
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 03-1693), 2004 WL
2911167 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae, Anti-Defamation League and Phi-
lip A. Cunningham, Ph.D.].
98. Indeed, by trying to include as many religious groups as possible, the
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sectarian standard. The left hopes that its adoption will frac-
ture the coalition supporting government-sponsored religion to
the point where it becomes politically unsustainable; the right
hopes that its adoption will act as a camel's nose in the tent for
more particular forms of government-sponsored religion.
B. THE NONSECTARIAN REQUIREMENT AND LEGISLATIVE
PRAYER
How the nonsectarian standard came to be associated with
legislative prayer is a story that begins with Marsh v. Cham-
bers.99 Marsh focused primarily on whether legislative prayer
was intrinsically constitutional.100 But toward the end of the
opinion, the Court addressed some fact-specific complaints the
plaintiff raised against Nebraska's chaplaincy in particular. 101
The plaintiff brought up how the prayers of the Nebraska chap-
lain were all based in "the Judeo-Christian tradition."102 This,
to the plaintiff, made them overly denominational-not only
were the prayers incompatible with atheism (as all legislative
prayers must be), they were also incompatible with other well-
established religious faiths, like Hinduism and Buddhism.103
The Court in Marsh only briefly responded to this argu-
ment, saying that "[t]he content of the prayer is not of concern
to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief."104 And, in a foot-
note quite removed from this discussion, the Court added in a
factual rejoinder. The Court noted that Nebraska's chaplain
had indeed made significant attempts to keep his prayers non-
denominational, having "removed all references to Christ after
a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator." 05
nonsectarian standard may increase the disfavor placed on nonbelievers. See
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992) ('That the intrusion was in the
course of promulgating religion that sought to be civic or nonsectarian rather
than pertaining to one sect does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objec-
tors. At best it narrows their number, at worst increases their sense of isola-
tion and affront.").
99. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
100. Id. at 786, 792-95.
101. Id. at 793-95.
102. Id. at 793.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 794-95.
105. Id. at 793 n.14.
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Marsh though was not the Supreme Court's final word on
this issue. Six years later, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the
Court addressed two holiday displays, ultimately upholding one
while striking down the other.106 In the course of its opinion,
the Court revisited Marsh and the restrictions it imposed on
the content of legislative prayers:
Indeed, in Marsh itself, the Court recognized that not even the
'unique history' of legislative prayer can justify contemporary legisla-
tive prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government with
any one specific faith or belief. The legislative prayers involved in
Marsh did not violate this principle because the particular chaplain
had 'removed all references to Christ.'107
This passage purports to be a summary of Marsh, but it is
a revisionary sort of summary. In Marsh, the fact that the
chaplain had removed all references to Christ seemed but a
background fact. The majority in Allegheny County here re-
makes it into a central holding of the case. Now any legislative
prayer that refers to Jesus Christ is apparently unconstitution-
al. Shifting majorities explain the change in tone. While Marsh
was a triumph for the right, Allegheny County was a triumph
for the left.'08 And part of the victory won by the liberals in Al-
legheny County was this small but fundamental change in
Marsh's meaning.
From these two different sources, courts have pulled two
different standards for evaluating the content of legislative
prayers. The right advances Marsh's more deferential lan-
guage, claiming that legislative prayer is unconstitutional only
when "the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize
or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or be-
lief."109 The left advances Allegheny County's reinterpretation,
claiming that each individual prayer must now be scrupulously
nonsectarian, which at least means "remov[ing] all references
to Christ."110 Some courts have adopted the former interpreta-
106. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989).
107. Id. at 603 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14).
108. Three of the five Justices in the Allegheny County majority-that is, a
majority of the Allegheny County majority-actually dissented in Marsh. The
Allegheny County majority consisted of Justices Brennan, Stevens, Marshall,
O'Connor, and Blackmun. Id. at 577- 78. The first three dissented in Marsh;
the last two were in the Marsh majority. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784, 795, 822.
109. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.




tion,111 while others have adopted the latter.112 And some
judges have understandably called out for better guidance.113
Yet while some confusion is understandable, there does
seem to be a fairly clear doctrinal answer. Being the more re-
cent Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject, Allegheny
County controls-and it is unambiguous in its deliberate mod-
ification of the Marsh standard. Allegheny County said that the
prayers in Marsh were constitutionally acceptable "because the
particular chaplain had removed all references to Christ."114
The implication is unavoidable: prayers with any reference to
Christ are unconstitutional. Some have called Allegheny Coun-
ty's reinterpretation of Marsh dicta. 15 And that is true.116 But
it also is irrelevant; lower courts are bound by the Supreme
Court's considered dicta as well as its holdings."17
The more important question, however, is what the Su-
preme Court will do with the nonsectarian standard. The Su-
preme Court, of course, has no obligation to follow its own ear-
lier precedent or that of anyone else.118 The next section
therefore turns from the descriptive to the prescriptive-from
what the rule currently is to what the rule should be.
111. See, e.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1271-72 (11th Cir.
2008); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1998).
112. See Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298-99 (4th Cir.
2004); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist., 52 Fed. App'x 355, 356-57 (9th
Cir. 2002).
113. See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 403 (7th Cir. 2006) (Kanne, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out "the Marsh majority's curious ambiguity on the
point" of whether sectarian prayer is permitted).
114. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
115. See, e.g., Robert Luther III & David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from
the "Prayer Police" Why the First Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative
Prayer and Demands a "Practice Focused" Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
569, 571, 575-76 (2008).
116. Being unnecessary to the decision, Allegheny County's interpretation
of Marsh must be classified as dicta. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 67 (1996) (explaining the differences between holding and dicta).
117. See, e.g., Jones v. St. Paul Cos., 495 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2007)
("[Flederal courts are bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta almost
as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings . . . ." (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); United States v. Marlow, 278 F.3d 581, 588 n.7 (6th
Cir. 2002); Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996); Nichol
v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975).
118. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) ('The doctrine of stare
decisis . . . has only a limited application in the field of constitutional law."
(quotation and citation omitted)).
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C. THE MERITS OF THE NONSECTARIAN REQUIREMENT
While the nonsectarian requirement has its share of prob-
lems, it serves some foundational constitutional values. There
is a reason why all courts have acknowledged at least some
constitutional limit on the content of legislative prayers. For
while judges differ on whether endorsements of religion are un-
constitutional, virtually everyone believes that endorsements of
one particular religion over another are unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court put it succinctly in Larson v. Valentell9: "The
clearest command of the Establishment Clause," the Court
said, "is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another."120 So settled is this proposition that
Michael McConnell once wrote that "[tihis conclusion has vo-
luminous support in the history of the First Amendment, and I
know of no First Amendment theorist who disputes it."121
Most importantly, this proposition has long been accepted
even in the noncoercive context of government speech and even
by Justices that entirely reject the neutrality principle. In Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, a case dealing with moments of silence, Justice
Rehnquist argued that "nothing in the Establishment Clause
requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and
irreligion."122 But he still affirmed that government was prohi-
bited from "asserting a preference for one religious denomina-
tion or sect over others."123 Justice Scalia took a similar tack in
his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, where he said he would uphold
public school graduation prayer-but only as long as it re-
mained nondenominational.12 4 And most recently, in a dissent
119. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
120. Id. at 244; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994)
(calling this "a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause").
121. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 115, 146 n.143 (1992).
122. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (con-
ceding that the Establishment Clause forbids a "government-sponsored en-
dorsement of religion. . . where the endorsement is sectarian").
That Justice Scalia would support the nonsectarian standard may be sur-
prising to some. But it comports with his view that all monotheists are wor-
shipping the same God, despite the differing labels they use. See id. at 646
('The Founders of our Republic knew . . . that nothing, absolutely nothing, is
so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration-
no, an affection-for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together,
to the God whom they all worship and seek." (emphasis added)); see also
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dis-
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that would have upheld a Ten Commandments display, the
conservative side of the Court all joined in an opinion condemn-
ing denominational religious speech by government. 125 Of the
nine Justices currently on the Court, the best guess is that
eight of them support this ban on denominational religious
speech-the only dissenter seems to be Justice Thomas.126
From a general ban on denominational religious speech,
the ban on sectarian prayers quickly and easily flows. Indeed,
the nonsectarian requirement seems to be just a contextualized
application of the general ban on denominational preferences.
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissenters in Lee v. Weisman,
said that graduation prayers were proper as long as prayergiv-
ers refrained from "specifying details upon which men and
women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the world are known to differ [such as] the divinity of
Christ."127 The McCreary County dissenters said that Ten
Commandments displays were permissible in part because they
were consistent with the religious beliefs of "a broad and di-
verse range of the population" including "[t]he three most popu-
lar religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam."128 This gives a first inkling of what a nonsectarian
standard looks like in the context of legislative prayer. Legisla-
tive prayers must be consistent at least with "Christianity, Ju-
daism and Islam"129 and cannot refer to disputed issues such as
senting) ("The Court thinks it surprising and truly ... remarkable to believe
that the deity the Framers had in mind . .. was the God of monotheism. This
reaction would be more comprehensible if the Court could suggest what other
God . . . there is, other than the God of monotheism." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
This claim, of course, carries with it some controversy; some Christians,
Jews, and Muslims would dispute worshipping the same God. See, e.g., Rob
Johnson & Mason Adams, Prayer Debate Swirls in Roanoke, ROANOKE TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 646416 ("If you're going to offer
a prayer and it's not in the name of Jesus, who is it being offered to-what dei-
ty is on call that day?") (statement attributed to Barney Arthur, a Baptist mi-
nister).
125. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., and in part by Kennedy, J.) (conceding the un-
constitutionality of a "government endorsement of a particular religious view-
point").
126. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Tho-
mas's view, articulated in Newdow, that the Establishment Clause creates no
judicially enforceable individual rights).
127. Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




"the divinity of Christ."130 These formulations from the con-
servative end of the Court differ little from Allegheny County's
command that prayergivers "remove[] all references to Chr-
ist."131 They all have the same core-legislative prayergivers
must avoid discussing the theological details that might pit
monotheists against each other.132
Yet another reason exists for a nonsectarian limitation in
the context of legislative prayer-one that is particular to the
nature of legislative prayer and its acceptance by the Court. In
Marsh, legislative prayer was held constitutional largely on
grounds of historical tradition.133 But the Marsh Court did not
accept legislative prayer merely as some obsolete historical rel-
ic. Instead, the Court saw a legitimate purpose in legislative
prayer-it was a way of encouraging unity and religious tolera-
tion. This is what Chief Justice Burger meant in Marsh when
he called legislative prayer an "acknowledgment of beliefs wide-
ly held among the people of this country."134 It is what Justice
Scalia later meant when he spoke of prayer as being an "impor-
tant unifying mechanism" for our citizenry.135 And Justice
O'Connor once put it this way as well. Sitting by designation in
a recent lower court case after her retirement from the Su-
preme Court, she said that legislative prayers that had been
constitutionally accepted all "shared a common characteristic:
they recognized the rich religious heritage of our country in a
fashion that was designed to include members of the communi-
ty."13 6 These Justices differ profoundly in their views of legisla-
tive prayer. Justice O'Connor conceives of legislative prayer as
a political ritual with religious trappings;137 Justice Scalia does
130. Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (quoting
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983)).
132. More remains to be said about the actual content of the nonsectarian
standard, but that will have to wait temporarily. See infra Parts II.D-E.
133. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
134. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
135. Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
136. See Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th
Cir. 2008) (O'Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 909 (2009).
137. Justice O'Connor, in a later case, put it this way:
The Court has permitted government, in some instances, to refer to or
commemorate religion in public life. See, e.g., . . . Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983). While the Court's explicit rationales have varied,
my own has been consistent; I believe that although these references
speak in the language of religious belief, they are more properly un-
derstood as employing the idiom for essentially secular purposes.
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not hesitate to emphasize the religious components of legisla-
tive prayer. 138 So it reflects something particularly important
that they all emphasize unity as legislative prayer's organizing
theme and its foundational purpose.
Perceptive lower courts have picked up on this theme. "The
genre [of legislative prayer] approved in Marsh," the Tenth Cir-
cuit has said, "is a kind of ecumenical activity that seeks to
bind peoples of varying faiths together in a common pur-
pose." 139 "Marsh requires that a divine appeal be wide-
ranging," the Fourth Circuit has said, "tying its legitimacy to
common religious ground."140 The value of legislative prayer
thus lies in its capacity to bring legislators and citizens togeth-
er-to help them recognize their common identity by stressing
the religious beliefs they (or at least most of them) have in
common.141 This is not just a theory of legislative prayer. It has
been the theory of legislative prayer; it was the theory upon
which legislative prayer was accepted in Marsh.
But the whole justification for allowing legislative prayers
simply dries up when prayers begin to use denomination-
specific language. Indeed, when prayers become denomination-
al, they are not only outside of Marsh's saving rationale, but
anathema to it. When prayers begin to focus on the particulars
of the speaker's theology, rather than on the common theologi-
cal elements shared by the speaker and the audience, legisla-
tive prayer can no longer serve any unifying purpose. All this is
to say that without a nonsectarian limitation, legislative prayer
will operate counter to some very deep constitutional values.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
138. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 892 (2005) (Scalia
J., dissenting) (explaining Marsh as "approv[ing] ... government-led prayer to
God").
139. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 1998).
140. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 287
(4th Cir. 2005); see also id. at 283 (arguing that legislative prayer "recognize[s]
the capacity of legislative invocations to bring the unifying aspects of our her-
itage to the difficult task of public deliberation").
141. People may reasonably question the extent to which these purposes
have been fulfilled by legislative prayer. But, at least in some instances, legis-
lative prayer has indeed been an agent of unity. See Robert J. Delahunty, "Va-
ried Carols" Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV.
517, 547 n.109 (2006-07) (describing the experience of the first Muslim visit-
ing chaplain before the House of Representatives); Lund, supra note 44, at
1204-05 (describing the invitations given by Congress to leaders of various
minority religious groups for them to pray).
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D. THE INCOHERENCE OBJECTION
We turn now to some frequent criticisms of the nonsecta-
rian standard. First on our list is a global objection directed at
the standard's coherence. Commentators have sometimes
maintained that the distinction between nonsectarian and sec-
tarian prayers is entirely illusory. They point out that every
prayer is sectarian in some sense, because every prayer is theo-
logically unacceptable to someone. 142 Even the most generic
prayers are premised on certain theological assumptions
shared by some but not by others.143 And one could also note
that every prayer is also nonsectarian in some sense, because
there is usually someone somewhere, beyond the individual
praying, who would agree with it.144
Yet, at least as it is presently framed, this incoherence ob-
jection should not prevail. It is true that there is no clear boun-
dary between sectarian and nonsectarian prayers. But that
does not make the nonsectarian standard incoherent or mea-
ningless. It means only that we are dealing with a continuous
variable rather than a dichotomous one. We are dealing with
differences in degree rather than differences in kind. So instead
142. See, e.g., Brief for Theologians and Scholars of Religion as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Appellant at 8, Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir.
2006) (Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781), 2006 WL 4820684 ("Every prayer, by its very
nature, reflects and conveys particular beliefs about the nature of the divine
and is thus 'sectarian."'); Delahunty, supra note 141, at 539 ("Prayer is inhe-
rently 'sectarian' [because] [n]o prayer can escape making particular claims
about the divine."); Martha McCarthy, The Law in Providing Education: Reli-
gious Influences in Public Schools: The Winding Path Toward Accommodation,
23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 565, 577 n.86 (2004) ("Because prayer by its na-
ture depicts a particular faith (those believing in prayer and God), 'nonsecta-
rian prayer' appears to be an oxymoron."); cf. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at
893 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If religion in the public forum had to be entirely
nondenominational, there could be no religion in the public forum at all.");
Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1234 n.10 ("[A]11 prayers 'advance' a particular faith or
belief in one way or another.").
143. See, e.g., Delahunty, supra note 141, at 539-40 & n.81 (explaining the
theological presuppositions underlying "God Bless America"); Laycock, supra
note 54, at 224-27 & nn.445-58 (explaining the theological presuppositions
underlying "under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance); Geoffrey R. Stone, In Op-
position to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 829 & n.45
(1983) (explaining the theological presuppositions underlying the Regent's
prayer in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)).
144. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the
Establishment Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 219, 267 (2008) (suggesting that because "[t]here are at least 31
types of Baptist," perhaps even identifiably Baptist prayers should still be
considered nonsectarian).
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of a dualistic model that asks whether a prayer is either secta-
rian or nonsectarian, we should consider a more refined ac-
count that asks how sectarian a prayer is. And we can get a
fairly standardized measure of the degree to which a prayer is
sectarian by looking at a ratio of two numbers-the number of
people who would see the prayer as consistent with their reli-
gious beliefs, and the number of people who would see the
prayer as inconsistent with their religious beliefs. This quotient
offers an admittedly crude approximation of the denomination-
al exclusivity of a particular prayer.
By looking at the factors that bear on this ratio, we can al-
so get a sense of what makes a prayer more or less sectarian.
Surely the most obvious is the prayer's theological content. The
more the prayer specifies about God, the fewer the people that
will agree with it, and the more sectarian it is. A Hail Mary is
more sectarian than a prayer to Jesus, which in turn is more
sectarian than a prayer to God. Another factor is the makeup of
the community in which the prayer is given. Some have called
the first congressional legislative prayer sectarian, in the sense
that the chaplain of the Continental Congress, Jacob Duch6, re-
ferred to Jesus Christ at the prayer's end.145 But Jacob Duch6
was praying to a generally Protestant Continental Congress-a
Continental Congress absolutely devoid of any Jews or Catho-
lics-and he stayed quite clear of any theological debates that
would have divided the attending Protestants. 46 This too
should enter the calculus.
Were we to insist on a perfectly standardized measure, we
would have to consider more, for how sectarian a prayer is de-
pends on more than just its theological content and the reli-
gious demographics of the surrounding community. Prayers can
be identifiably denominational without having any theological
content particular to that denomination. Take, for example, the
Lord's Prayer-a frequently given legislative prayerl 47-and
145. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States of America at 10 &
n.2, Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781),
2006 WL 4820685; Brief of Amicus Curiae State of South Carolina at 14,
Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-2069), 2003 WL
25463480.
146. See Lund, supra note 44, at 1177-82.
147. See, e.g., Becky Johnson & Bibeka Shrestha, The Great Divide: Chris-
tians Stick to One of Last Vestiges of Prayer in Public Life, SMOKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS (Waynesville, N.C.), Jan. 5, 2010, available at http://www.smoky
mountainnews.com/issues/01-10/01-06-10/frgreaLdivide.html; Kris Kitto,
History's Witnesses, THE HILL, Jan. 5, 2010, available at http://thehill.com/
capital-living/cover-stories/74459-historys-witnesses. But see Akron Council
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whether it is sectarian. Jews and Muslims may have no objec-
tions to the theology expressed in the Lord's Prayer. 148 But al-
though they could perhaps say the prayer without crossing
their fingers (theologically speaking), they never would. The
prayer is simply outside of their tradition. 149
Take also the fact that the dominant religious majority is
often not in a good place to even see the ways in which their
prayers are sectarian. Most Protestants have no idea that
Catholics do not say the last stanza of their Lord's Prayer, or
that Presbyterians (and other Reformed Christians) substitute
"debts" for "trespasses."15 0 But Catholics and Presbyterians
know it-and when the Lord's Prayer is prayed in public, they
know from the subtle wording of the prayer that the prayer is
not really theirs.
One of the arguments pressed during the Ten Command-
ments litigation was the claim that the Ten Commandments
themselves were sectarian, because Jews and Christians had
different versions and the government had chosen to go with a
Christian version.15' The McCreary County dissenters dis-
Drops Lord's Prayer After AU Protest, CHURCH & STATE, Dec. 1, 2007, at 3,
available at 2007 WLNR 26079155; Christopher Scott, Council Drops Lord's
Prayer, THE SUN (Lowell, Mass.), Apr. 25, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
7836202.
148. Much of the Lord's Prayer is derived from parts of various older Jew-
ish texts. This makes sense, given Jesus' religious background, but it some-
times surprises people. See Ron Csillag, The Radical Truth Behind the Lord's
Prayer: The Best-Known Invocation in Christianity Has its Roots Firmly in
Jewish Tradition, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 23, 2008, at 7, available at http://www
.thestar.com/living/Religion/article/306187.
149. Early courts suggested that the Lord's Prayer was nonsectarian pre-
cisely because it came from Jewish sources. See, e.g., Doremus v. Bd. of Educ.,
75 A.2d 880, 887-88 (N.J. 1950) ("[Nlothing [in the Lord's Prayer] is called to
our attention as not proper to come from the lips of any believer in God, His
fatherhood, and His supreme power. Christ was a Jew and He was speaking to
Jews; and it is said, on excellent Jewish authority that the prayer was based
upon the ancient Jewish prayer called 'the Kaddish.' . . . . We find nothing in
the Lord's Prayer that is controversial, ritualistic or dogmatic." (citation omit-
ted)).
150. The "debts" version is found in the early Wycliffe translation of the
Bible, used by Presbyterian and other Reformed Churches. Matthew 6:9-13
(Wycliffe). The "trespasses" version is used by the later Tyndale translation,
Matthew 6:9-13 (Tyndale), and was used in the first Book of Common Prayer.
THE FIRST BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER OF EDWARD VI 24 (Rev. Henry Basker-
ville Walton, ed., 1870) (1549). Catholics do not say the doxology at the end of
the Lord's Prayer, though they do say it later in the Mass.
151. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Anti-Defamation League and Philip A.
Cunningham, Ph.D., supra note 97, at 4-5. For a full version of the argument,
see Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and
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missed the argument in a footnote; Justice Scalia said that the
dispute was a minor one that would be invisible to a reasonable
observer.152 But Jews who see the dispute-who understand
that there are multiple versions of the Ten Commandments
and that the government has gone with the Christian version-
they are hardly unreasonable observers. They are, in fact, the
ones seeing the situation for what it really is. Knowing little
about Judaism and uninterested in finding out more, their gov-
ernment has put up a Christian text under the erroneous as-
sumption that the Jewish text was identical (or at least similar
enough that no one of sufficient importance would notice or
care). These dangers of misunderstanding are magnified by the
fact that even the smallest deviations in theological language
can have vast import. Consider what happened in 1054, when
the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church
divided in part over the Filioque Clause of the Nicene Creed-
the Orthodox Church claimed that the Holy Spirit "proceeds
from the Father," while the Catholic Church insisted that it
"proceeds from the Father and the Son."153 A fight over three
small words helped cause one of the largest schisms in the his-
tory of Christianity. 154
This is enough to make the necessary point. We can devel-
op a more complicated account of the nonsectarian/sectarian
distinction, going far beyond the easy dichotomy used in the
past. But as we insist on a more accurate and standardized
measure, our difficulties actually begin to increase. For as our
account becomes more and more refined, it becomes more and
more difficult to apply. Questions of administration and institu-
tional competence begin to loom particularly large.
E. THE WORKABILITY OBJECTION
At this point then, we can reformulate the incoherence ob-
jection into a stronger one that relates to workability. We may
Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1481-1500 (2005).
152. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 909 n.12 (2005) (Sca-
lia, J., dissenting) ("The sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not
widely known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even aware that there
are competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not). In
any event, the context of the display here could not conceivably cause the
viewer to believe that the government was taking sides in a doctrinal contro-
versy.").
153. See 2 JAROSIAV PELIKAN, THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: A HISTORY OF




be able to standardize measurements of denominational exclu-
sivity along some sort of spectrum. But courts deal in dichoto-
mies, not spectrums. At the end of the day, a reviewing court
must make a thumbs-up or thumbs-down determination. The
prayers are either constitutional or they are not. The question
becomes whether a just and proper line can be fairly drawn, or
whether the task is simply not suitable to judicial resolution.
We begin with a thoughtful articulation of the issue by the
Eleventh Circuit in Pelphrey v. Cobb County.155 In rejecting the
nonsectarian standard and deciding to go with one more defe-
rential to state and local governments, Pelphrey expressed
skepticism about the ability of courts to draw a workable line:
We would not know where to begin to demarcate the boundary be-
tween sectarian and nonsectarian expressions, and the [plaintiff]
taxpayers have been opaque in explaining that standard. Even the
individual taxpayers cannot agree on which expressions are "secta-
rian." Bats, one of the taxpayers, testified that a prohibition of "secta-
rian" references would preclude the use of "father," "Allah," and "Zo-
raster" but would allow "God" and "Jehovah." Selman, another
taxpaver, testified. "[Y]ou can't say Jesus, ... Jehovah. ... [or] Wic-
ca ....
... When asked, for example, whether "King of kings" was secta-
rian, [plaintiffs' counsel] replied, "King of kings may be a tough
one .. . It is arguably a reference to one God . .. I think it is safe to
conclude that it might not be sectarian."
The difficulty experienced by taxpayers' counsel is a glimpse of
what county commissions, city councils, legislatures, and courts
would encounter if we adopted the taxpayers' indeterminate stan-
dard. 156
We should not dismiss this concern out of hand. Lower
courts need guidance, as do the primary actors responsible for
legislative prayer: the states, cities, and counties all engaging
in it. But this workability problem is not unsolvable. There are
legitimate ways of getting a judicially manageable rule out of
the constitutional norm forbidding denominational discrimina-
tion. Allegheny County offers a valuable first approximation-
legislative prayergivers, the Court said, have to 'remove all
references to Christ."'15 7 Especially for a case not about legisla-
tive prayer, this is a reasonable first attempt. It mirrors Justice
Scalia's insistence that prayers not take positions on issues
155. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (alteration in
original).
156. Id. at 1272.
157. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (quoting
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983)).
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that would divide monotheists, such as on "the divinity of Chr-
ist."158 And it parallels the McCreary County dissenters' insis-
tence that religious speech at least be consistent with "[t]he
three most popular religions in the United States, Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam."159
These standards together suggest a possible response to
Judge Pryor. Religious language objectionable to any of the
three major monotheistic religions (Christians, Jews, and Mus-
lims) is overly sectarian and unconstitutional; language accept-
able to all three religions is nonsectarian and constitutional.
Thus, terms like Lord, Father, and King of Kings should all be
constitutionally acceptable. Only more specific terms-like de-
votional references to Jesus or Allah-should be constitutional-
ly off limits.
Of course, this standard will face withering criticism from
both sides. Some will see it as unduly rigorous. Some will see it
as insufficiently rigorous. Both will see it as drawing arbitrary
distinctions. But these are inevitable problems whenever spec-
trum variables are dichotomized. They are the cost of having to
break a very generalized and amorphous standard down into a
set of bright-line rules. Now no one doubts that doctrinal rules
must relate to the constitutional harms they seek to prevent.
As Justice Scalia recently put it in Vieth v. Jubelirer, "[t]his
Court may not willy-nilly apply standards-even manageable
standards-having no relation to constitutional harms."160 But
the constitutional harm here-denominational discrimina-
tion-is plain, and of prominent importance in the constitu-
tional order. And the constitutional standard-the prohibition
on sectarian references-bears an obvious connection to it. This
then seems the acceptable sort of "mild substantive distortion"
that comes whenever a court creates a judicially manageable
rule to implement a more generalized constitutional com-
mand.161
158. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
160. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 295 (2004) (plurality opinion); see al-
so Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitution-
al Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1282-85 (2006).
161. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1178 (1989) ("Much better, even at the expense of the mild substantive
distortion that any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enun-
ciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision.").
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Bolstering the claim of workability is the fact that this
nonsectarian standard has already been adopted before in some
of the political branches. "In February 2006, both the Air Force
and the Navy issued guidelines that included restrictions on
the use of sectarian language in ceremonial prayer."162 Legisla-
tion that would have changed these guidelines was introduced
in. Congress but failed, although the Air Force has apparently
retracted the guidelines. 163 The congressional chaplains are not
bound by any formal rules regarding the content of their pray-
ers, but they now go out of their way to accommodate people
from a wide variety of religious backgrounds.16 4 Much seemed
to change when a case filed shortly after Marsh was decided,
where a plaintiff claimed that the Senate chaplain had dispa-
raged nonbelievers with certain prayers.165 The chaplain apolo-
gized and took steps not to do it again, and the case was dis-
missed as moot.166
162. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The
Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110W. VA. L. REV. 89, 149 (2007).
163. Id. at 150-51.
164. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. H9821, H9823-03 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 2003)
(prayer of Chaplain Coughlin) ("Over the weekend, Jews of this country again
kept holy the Sabbath, Christians celebrated their discipleship in Jesus, and
Muslims began the great fast and spiritual renewal of Ramadan."); 147 CONG.
REC. H10,175, H10,179-03 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2001) (prayer of Chaplain
Coughlin):
Our Jewish brothers and sisters bring light to a dark world dur-
ing Hanukkah, praying for the end of violence in the Middle East;
they assure us that the lamp of faith is not diminished, but grows
stronger day by day.
Our Christian brothers and sisters long for the celebration of the
birth of Jesus. They pray that this assembly further the incarnation
of peace, justice, and love in this world.
Our Muslim brothers and sisters, having finished their purifying
fast, now with hearts and minds renewed, turn to You with greater
faith that a new day of understanding, compassion, and prophetic
truth is rapidly approaching.
165. See Kurtz v. Baker, 644 F. Supp. 613, 615 (D.D.C. 1986).
Awaken us to the reality that to govern without God is to be a
godless government and a godless government soon loses its concern
for human rights, minorities and all people.
We are grateful for our legacy as a Nation . . . . Help us never to
forget that this is fundamental to our system of values which would
be nonexistent if our Founding Fathers had declared: "We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are descended from mon-
keys. . . ."
Help us . . . to realize that the God-factor is fundamental to our




And while some challenge the workability of the nonsecta-
rian standard, the potential alternatives seem more unworka-
ble. Some have suggested, for example, that prayers be eval-
uated collectively rather than individually.1 6 7 Only when a
certain percentage of the prayers use Christian references
would the overall prayer experience become unconstitutionally
denominational. Yet shifting the focus in this way just ampli-
fies the line-drawing problems. For now not only must we still
decide what makes a prayer overly denominational, we must
also decide what proportion of overly denominational prayers
triggers a finding of unconstitutionality.
There are no easy points of differentiation here. The Santa
Fe dissenters who voted in favor of having graduation prayer
casually suggested a 90% line-that is, if nine out of ten pray-
ers were identifiably Christian, the overall experience might
suggest undue favoritism for Christianity.168 Now where that
number came from, nobody really knows. Lower courts, facing
real-life scenarios, have made a number of judgments, not all
reconcilable with each other. The Seventh Circuit enjoined a
prayer practice where 64% of the prayers were Christian. 69
The Eleventh Circuit upheld two practices that came in at 68%
and 70%.170 One California court struck down a prayer practice
with just 20% of the prayers being Christian.171 Of course, any
number here will be arbitrary; to say that the breaking point is
Id. (listing three examples of prayers by Chaplain Halverson that the plaintiff
found disparaging).
166. Id. at 613.
167. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
168. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 321 (2000) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting):
It is also conceivable that the election could lead to a Christian prayer
before 90 percent of the football games. If, upon implementation, the
policy operated in this fashion, we would have a record before us to
review whether the policy, as applied, violated the Establishment
Clause or unduly suppressed minority viewpoints.
169. See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 394 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a
preliminary injunction against the prayer practice after noting that "[o]f the
45 invocations for which transcripts are available, 29 were identifiably Chris-
tian").
170. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008)
(upholding two prayer policies where "70 percent of prayers before the County
Commission and 68 percent of prayers before the Planning Commission con-
tained Christian references").
171. See Rubin v. City of Burbank, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1194, 1204 (Ct. App.
2002) (striking down the policy even though "only about 20 percent of the vo-




at 50% or 75% or 90% or 99% Christian prayers is merely to
choose a number out of the air.172 Marsh managed to avoid this
sticky issue because the chaplain there had agreed to stop us-
ing denominational references by the time of the litigation, but
modern courts are not so lucky. 173
And simply choosing a number will not end the difficulties.
Courts will still have to make other difficult decisions-such as
sample sizes, for example. The Fifth Circuit once had a case
where there were four stipulated prayers in the record, all of
which were Christian in nature, 174 but the judges disagreed on
whether that legitimately proved some favoritism for Chris-
tianity.175 Another issue here regards sliding scales-perhaps
some prayers are so overtly denominational that they should
reduce the overall percentage of denominational prayers neces-
sary to sustain a plaintiff's claim.
Yet there is a deeper problem with considering prayers col-
lectively, one that goes to the heart of the issue. And it is this:
framing our inquiry in terms of percentages risks losing sight
of what denominational neutrality really requires. If we begin
from the premise that there is an acceptable percentage of
172. Some courts have resisted such a quantitative analysis. See Turner v.
City Council of Fredericksburg, No. 3:06CV23, 2006 WL 2375715, at *4 (E.D.
Va. August 14, 2006) (rejecting the claim that the court should undertake a
"quantitative analysis of the number and percentage of references to a specific
deity").
173. One wonders how it would have changed the dynamics in Marsh had
the chaplain not so agreed-in the trial court, the Marsh plaintiffs went
through a published book of the chaplain's legislative prayers and determined
that forty-eight percent of them were identifiably Christian. See Joint Appen-
dix at 55, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Deposition of Chap. Pal-
mer) ("Q: And during that five year period approximately 48 percent of the
prayers that were at least published used the word Jesus or reference to Jesus
Christ, would that be correct, sir? A: I'll take your word for it, I haven't
counted them up.") (on file with the author).
174. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 192-93 (5th Cir.
2006) ("The stipulations contained four of the prayers given; each contained a
reference to 'Jesus Christ' or 'God' and 'Lord.'. . . It was not stipulated that the
above four prayers were representative, or typical, of those offered at Board
meetings. Each prayer in the stipulations is Christian in tenor, if not in fact.")
(emphasis omitted), rehk'g en banc granted, 478 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 2007).
175. Compare id. at 204 ("[N]o evidence exists that any prayers were given
by non-Christians. Based on the four prayers in the stipulations, it is reasona-
ble to infer none were. Accordingly, by providing only Christians who pre-
sented Christian prayers, the Board . .. aggressively advocated Christianity."
(citations and quotations omitted)), with id. at 215 (Clement, J., dissenting)
("The foundation for the holding that the Board improperly advanced Chris-
tianity is ... nothing more than an inference based on the four prayers in the
stipulations." (citations and quotations omitted)).
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overtly denominational prayers, we are tempted to engage in
demographics. We might say, for example, that denominational
bias for Christianity exists only when the percentage of Chris-
tian prayers exceeds the percentage of Christians in the sur-
rounding community. Denominational neutrality in this sense
becomes a requirement of denominational proportionality and
nothing more.
But this is a terribly incomplete notion of denominational
neutrality. In fact, it is perfectly consistent with the rankest
forms of denominational exclusivity. It essentially takes the
Mayor's position in the Wynne case, where the plaintiff alleged
that the town's legislative prayers were almost always Chris-
tian and the Mayor responded by testifying that, well, "ninety-
nine percent of the people in the town are Christian."176 This is
really religious majoritarianism; it is not denominational neu-
trality at all.
One other alternative remains to be tried. Consider the
prime alternative to a strict ban on denominational refer-
ences-namely the language from Marsh that asked merely if
"the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or ad-
vance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief." 77
This standard looks at things differently. Instead of looking ex-
clusively at denominational references, it focuses on other
things like proselytization and disparagement. But such a
standard too seems far less workable than a strict ban on sec-
tarian (or denominational) references. Take, for example, the
concept of proselytizing. Although the Court has at times tried
to explain what it means for a prayer to be sectarian,178 it has
never tried to define what it means to proselytize.179 Justice
Kennedy tried to give meaning to the term in his Allegheny
County dissent, but he ended up suggesting that the two words
were mostly synonyms for each other-or at least that clearly
176. Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 296 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004).
177. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
178. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
179. See Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State's Podium: What
Speech is Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J.
PUB. L. 83, 85 (2007) ("[The Supreme Court has] never defined the term 'prose-
lytize,' much less provided any workable legal test for determining precisely
what qualifies as prohibited proselytizing."). For a thoughtful analysis of the
ambiguities of the term, see Richard W. Garnett, Changing Minds: Proselyt-




sectarian speech amounted to proselytizing.18 0 Lower courts
have run into the same difficulty. In Pelphrey, for example, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the strict nonsectarian requirement
as being unworkable, going instead with the proselytization
standard described above. But in deciding whether the prayer
was proselytizing, the court turned to several factors it thought
relevant-the most prominent of which was whether the prayer
was sectarian.181 That was an extraordinary irony; Pelphrey
claimed to find the nonsectarian standard thoroughly unwork-
able, but then incorporated it as a factor into a more compli-
cated yet somehow now workable test. 182
The proselytizing test seems inevitably to boil down to one
of two things. It could become a variant of the nonsectarian
standard; one could see it, for example, as requiring that a cer-
tain percentage of prayers be sectarian before the process as a
whole is considered proselytizing. Or it could simply become a
way that courts get out of the business of reviewing legislative
prayers. The latter seems more likely. If past cases are any
guide, the proselytizing language of Marsh would likely lead to
almost complete judicial deference to state and local govern-
ments.
Again the Pelphrey case offers us an instructive example.
Rejecting the stricter nonsectarian standard, Judge Pryor ap-
plied the more deferential proselytizing standard.183 Here is
180. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, and White, J.J.) ("I doubt not,
for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of
a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. . . . Because such an obtrusive year-
round religious display would place the government's weight behind an ob-
vious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.").
Note that Justice Kennedy was not even talking about actual speech being
proselytizing; he was talking about the impact of viewing a religious display.
This would suggest that all clearly sectarian language is inherently proselytiz-
ing. Indeed, the majority in Allegheny County understood it that way. See id.
at 608 (majority opinion) ("[P]erhaps the only real distinction between Justice
Kennedy's 'proselytization' test [and the majority's test] is a burden of 'unmis-
takable' clarity that Justice Kennedy apparently would require of government
favoritism for specific sects in order to hold the favoritism in violation of the
Establishment Clause.").
181. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1277-78 (11th Cir.
2008).
182. See id. at 1271 (considering "several factors to determine whether the
legislative prayers had been exploited to advance one faith" and noting that
"[t]he 'nonsectarian' nature of the chaplain's prayers [is] one factor in this fact-
intensive analysis; it [does] not form the basis for a bright-line rule").
183. See id. at 1266-67.
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Judge Pryor's analysis of that issue, with regard to the one of
the two legislative bodies at issue:
Our main task is to evaluate whether the factual findings by the dis-
trict court, which we review for clear error, are supported by the
record. The district court found that the prayers of the county com-
mission had not been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or
to disparage any other, faith or belief ....
The finding that the diverse references in the prayers, viewed cu-
mulatively, did not advance a single faith also was not clearly errone-
ous. The prayers included references from Christianity and other
faiths, which the district court found tended to further militate
against a finding that the Commissions' practices had been exploited
to affiliate the government with a particular faith. Most of the refer-
ences were brief and occurred at the end of each prayer. Some prayers
included references to "Jesus Christ," but others referenced "Allah,"
"Mohammed," and the Torah. Prayers included a variety of terms,
such as "king of kings and lord of lords," "Heavenly Father," and "God
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, God of history, Lord of creation, Lord of
love, our Father." The diversity of the religious expressions, in con-
trast with the prayers in the Judeo-Christian tradition allowed in
Marsh, supports the finding that the prayers, taken as a whole, did
not advance any particular faith.184
The Eleventh Circuit here avoids any intrusive examina-
tion into the operation of Cobb County's legislative prayer prac-
tice. For one thing, the court applies the wrong standard of re-
view. While factual findings are reviewed for clear error, the
disagreement here was not factual. There was no dispute about
the content of the County's prayers or the frequency of the sec-
tarian references. What the parties disagreed about was the le-
gal implications of the facts-that is, whether the agreed-upon
facts constituted a violation of the legal standard.185 Such deci-
sions are reviewed de novo.186 But even more noticeable is
Pelphrey's almost conclusory nature. Pelphrey lays out the legal
184. Id. at 1277-78 (citations and quotations omitted).
185. Id. at 1271-74 (describing the taxpayers' arguments regarding the
appropriate legal standard and whether the facts at issue violated that stan-
dard).
186. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588, at 599 (2d ed. 1995) ("If the findings of the trial
court are not challenged on appeal, the reviewing court is concerned only with
the legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts as found by the trial judge
[which means] that the 'clearly erroneous' restriction is not applicable and
that the trial court's rulings on questions of law are reviewable as in other le-
gal contexts without any comparable limitation."); see also Carmichael v. Nis-
san Motor Acceptance Corp., 291 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Because
the material facts are not in dispute and the only issue is one of law, we re-
view the order of the district court de novo.").
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standard, then recites the agreed-upon facts, and then con-
cludes that the district court did not clearly err in upholding
Cobb County's program. 187 It does not try to demarcate the con-
stitutional boundary; it offers no suggestions about what a vi-
olation of the legal standard would look like. It ends up sug-
gesting that the presence of a few non-Christian references or
speakers saves a legislative prayer program, regardless of how
frequent the Christian references are.188 It might even allow
individual prayers that are proselytizing, as long as there is a
thread of diversity in the whole scheme. If such token diversity
is all that the Establishment Clause requires, states and local
governments will have no real problem. But little will be left of
the requirement of denominational neutrality. In the last anal-
ysis then, Pelphrey and other cases suggest that in the absence
of a bright-line rule against sectarian references, the ban on
denominational preferences will likely go almost entirely unen-
forced by the judiciary. If there are to be judicially enforceable
limitations on the content of legislative prayer, those limita-
tions will have to look something like Allegheny County's non-
sectarian requirement.
F. THE CENSORSHIP OBJECTION
Having found the nonsectarian standard to be a relatively
workable implementation of the prohibition on denominational
preferences, we now turn and face the most disturbing of its
implications. The nonsectarian standard protects listeners, but
in doing so, it necessarily imposes restrictions on speakers.
Prayer will not come in a nonsectarian fashion merely by acci-
dent. Government will have to restrain itself. And because the
government speaks through people, this means engaging in a
disturbing sort of censorship-denominational language will
have to be redacted, and nonconforming speakers will have to
be excluded. This is, to put it mildly, an unsavory task. This
section addresses the claim that such censoring is unconstitu-
tional. It concludes that while the constitutional arguments
fail, the underlying moral issues are more vexing.189
187. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1266-68, 1277.
188. Id. at 1277-78 (emphasizing how "[t]he diversity of religious expres-
sions ... supports the finding that the prayers, taken as a whole, did not ad-
vance any particular faith).
189. For the arguments that this censoring is unconstitutional, see Dela-
hunty, supra note 141, at 528-32; Klukowski, supra note 144, at 277-80;
Luther & Caddell, supra note 115, at 585-87; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of
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1. The Constitutionality of Censorship
Since Marsh, there have been several cases involving the
distinct posture of a speaker claiming a right to offer sectarian
prayers. 190 Consider Turner v. City of Fredericksburg, where
the City Council of Fredericksburg adopted a policy requiring
all prayers (which were traditionally given by City Council
members) to be nonsectarian. 191 One city council member,
Hasmel Turner, insisted on giving sectarian prayers, and when
he was excluded from giving prayers altogether, he sued.192 His
claim was straightforward-the City Council discriminated
against him precisely because of the kind of prayer he wanted
to give. 193
This argument has natural force. Government usually
cannot discriminate against private speakers based on the con-
tent or viewpoint of their speech. 194 And, to be sure, nonsecta-
the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Defendants-Appellants,
supra note 95, at 15-19.
190. Many local government bodies have adopted policies requiring prayers
to be nonsectarian. See Larissa Chinwah, Guidelines Set for Prayer at Carpen-
tersville Board Meetings, DAILY HERALD (Arlington, Ill.), June 5, 2008, at 4,
available at http://dailyherald.com/story/?id=203228&src=5 (announcing the
nonsectarian policy of the Carpentersville, Ill. Village Board); Carlos Illescas,
City Goes Lite on Invocations, DENVER POST, Nov. 21, 2006, at A01, available
at 2006 WLNR 20208624 (explaining the nonsectarian policy of the Aurora,
Colo. City Council); Melinda Johnston, Invocation Will Be Either Silent or
Nonsectarian, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 20, 2007, at 4S, available at 2007
WLNR 18383676 (explaining the nonsectarian policy of the Mint Hill, N.C.
Town Commissioners); Tom Steadman, Council Votes on Prayer, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC., July 17, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 13681870 (an-
nouncing the nonsectarian policy of the High Point, N.C. City Council). Contra
Michael Hewlett, Prayer Policy Passes 6 to 1: Thomasville Board Bucks Legal
Advice, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 20, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR
5275786 (announcing a policy permitting sectarian prayer at the Thomasville,
N.C. City Council).
191. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 353 (4th Cir.
2008).
192. See Kiran Krishnamurthy, Prayer Led By Council Reviewed: Appeals
Court Debates Dispute Over Member's Pre-Meeting Invocation, RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 20, 2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 5681721.
193. Turner, 534 F.3d at 354. This issue also frequently arises in cases
where there is a challenge to a local governmental body's policy of permitting
sectarian prayers. In such situations, the government sometimes argues in its
defense that not only are sectarian prayers constitutional, but that it cannot
dare to censor such prayers without running afoul of the Constitution. See,
e.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006).
194. In the Court's terminology, content-based and viewpoint-based dis-
criminations on private speech are presumptively invalid. See Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
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rian prayer policies are the epitome of both content-based dis-
crimination and viewpoint-based discrimination. 195 Yet there is
an important twist-while government cannot discriminate
among private speakers on the basis of their speech, no such
rules apply to speech that comes from the government itself.
When the government itself speaks, it can usually say what it
likes.196 The question then is whether legislative prayer
represents governmental or private speech. If the latter, Turn-
er's claims of unconstitutional censorship might have some va-
lidity. If the former, his claims are meritless.
Distinguishing between government speech and private
speech is famously difficult-only at the extremes is the differ-
ence clear. Generally speaking, the government-speech monik-
er applies when the government seeks to send a message of its
own, even if private parties are used to deliver the govern-
ment's message. 197 The leading case here remains Rust v. Sul-
livan, which involved a challenge to a law that provided doctors
with family planning funds but conditioned the money on the
doctors not discussing abortion.198 The Supreme Court in Rust
upheld this gag rule, explaining that the government was try-
ing to send an antiabortion messagel 99-and that, in so doing,
195. Nonsectarian prayer policies bar speakers from presenting certain
prayers because of their content-i.e., their sectarian references. They are
thus the sine qua non of content-based discrimination. They are also clear ex-
amples of viewpoint discrimination. The distinction between viewpoint dis-
crimination and content discrimination, of course, is not entirely clear. See,
e.g., Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REV. 84, 105 (1998) ("[It is hardly clear that the line between view-
point and other forms of content discrimination can be sustained, except pos-
sibly in extreme cases."). But the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that ex-
cluding all religious perspectives on a subject matter while permitting secular
messages constitutes viewpoint discrimination. See Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 110 (2001) (holding that "the exclusion of the
Good News Club's activities . . . constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination"); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 845 (1995) (finding "viewpoint discrimination inherent in the Uni-
versity's regulation"); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). To exclude
sectarian religious speeches while barring nonsectarian ones thus seems a for-
tiori viewpoint discrimination-in fact, it is just a more particularized and bla-
tant type of viewpoint discrimination than that in the Good News line of cases.
196. See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment's
Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 30 (2007) ("Government speech essentially oper-
ates as an 'exception' to the First Amendment .... ).
197. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991).
198. See id. at 179-81.
199. See id. at 192-93.
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the government had unbridled discretion to shape the message
it wanted to convey and to regulate any private speakers (such
as the doctors) to make sure they conveyed it accurately. 200
On the other hand, when the government is not trying to
send a message of its own, but is instead trying to create a
place for individuals to speak, the resulting speech is consi-
dered private.201 The paradigmatic example of this was Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, where a
public university denied generally available school funding to a
student publication because of the publication's religious cha-
racter.202 The Court explained that this publication was not
government speech because the university was not "speak[ing]
or subsidiz[ing] transmittal of a message it favors."203 Instead,
by funding a wide variety of student organizations, the school
was "encourag[ing] a diversity of views from private speak-
ers,"204 making the resulting speech private in nature. From
this, the Supreme Court concluded that the government's deni-
al of funding discriminated against private speakers on the ba-
sis of the content of their speech and thus was unconstitution-
al.205
The line between governmental speech and private speech
is often thin and hard to discern.206 But legislative prayer clear-
200. Rust is also consistent with the one of the Supreme Court's more re-
cent government speech cases, which reaffirms that speech of ostensibly pri-
vate actors is still "government speech" when the government is directing the
message. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("The
Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counsel-
ing activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech;
when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust
on this understanding."). Rust is also consistent with the Supreme Court's
most recent government speech case, which reaffirms that speech of ostensibly
private actors is still "government speech" when the government is directing
the message. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
201. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 834 (1995).
202. See id. at 822-23.
203. See id. at 834.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 837.
206. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("What is, and what is not, 'govern-
ment speech' is a nebulous concept, to say the least."); Caroline Mala Corbin,
Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 605, 612 (2008) ("While the existence of the government speech doctrine
is now firmly established, its contours are not.").
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ly falls on the government speech side of the line. The name it-
self does some of the work: legislative prayer is prayer by a leg-
islature-it is government speech by definition. This conclusion
is clearest when government employees give the prayer. Take,
for example, the congressional chaplains-Congress hired them
to give prayers, and Congress pays their salaries. Their speech
is Congress's speech, 207 and if Congress wants them to pray in a
particular fashion (nonsectarian or otherwise), it will have the
authority to so demand. 208 This same logic applies to all gov-
ernment employees. When a city councilman or county commis-
sioner has the chance to offer a prayer because of his govern-
mental position, such a prayer is governmental speech.209 The
proper result in cases like Turner, therefore, seems clear.210
As an example of how government speech and private speech often bleed
together, consider the flurry of litigation in recent years over state-issued li-
cense plates that take controversial positions, like the "Choose Life" license
plate that South Carolina commissioned for its citizens to choose whether to
put on their cars. If such a plate is considered government speech-if it is just
South Carolina's statement that its citizens should choose life-there is no
constitutional problem with it. But if such a plate is considered private
speech-if it is a statement by drivers with such plates that they choose life-
then the government is unconstitutionally discriminating against private pro-
choice speakers by not offering pro-choice plates. The problem is that the
plates are both. They are both government speech (after all, the government
chose to only make pro-life plates) as well as private speech (after all, the indi-
vidual chose to display those plates). See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d
370, 380 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that "at least three circuits (4th, 5th, and 6th) will have spoken
on the [license plate] issue, reaching at least three different conclusions, via at
least sixteen separate opinions").
207. As the Senate put it in the Badger Report in 1853, a congressional
chaplain is "an officer of the house which chooses him, and nothing more." S.
REP. No. 32-376, at 2 (1853).
208. This is clear enough from Rust and Rosenberger, but the Supreme
Court in fact held as much in a recent case, which concluded that statements
made by governmental employees in conducting their official duties simply did
not implicate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 421-22 (2006) ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public em-
ployee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the em-
ployee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise
of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created.").
209. This logic also applies to cases where military chaplains claim a con-
stitutional right to engage in sectarian prayer, despite being directed not to do
so. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 162, at 137. For an example of such a claim,
see Klingenschmitt v. Winter, 275 F. App'x 12, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
210. Justice Brennan saw the public/private speech issue in his Marsh dis-
sent and responded forcefully: "we are faced here with the regularized practice
of conducting official prayers, on behalf of the entire legislature, as part of the
order of business constituting the formal opening of every single session of the
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The same conclusion follows even when governments allow
outside persons to come in and offer prayers.211 It is true that
the speech now has aspects of private speech: the people pray-
ing are now not government officials, and they usually retain
quite a bit of discretion over what they choose to say. But this
still falls within the doctrinal boundaries of government speech.
Just as the government can impose a gag rule on doctors to sa-
tisfy the objectives of its program, 212 so too the government can
impose a gag rule on speakers to satisfy the objectives of a non-
sectarian prayer program.213
Indeed, the conclusion that legislative prayer does not in-
volve private speech quickly follows almost as a corollary from
what was said earlier about the purposes of legislative prayer.
The point of having legislative prayer is to foster an inclusive
legislative atmosphere. It is not to provide a place for private
speech; private citizens already have plenty of places to pray. 214
The point, again, is unity-this was the rationale upon which
legislative prayer was approved in Marsh.215 And so to accom-
plish this objective-to ensure that legislative prayer continues
to serve its proper purpose-the government speech doctrine
gives government unchecked authority to exclude prayers that
are not unifying. To put it in other words, the government's de-
sire to present a nonsectarian message acts as the constitution-
al justification for excluding sectarian prayers. To the unini-
tiated, this may sound like circular reasoning-government
legislative term. If this is free exercise, the Establishment Clause has no
meaning whatsoever." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 813 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
211. Local governments do this in different ways. Sometimes clergy are
nominated by a government official. See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 395
(7th Cir. 2006) (permitting outside clergy to give invocations when nominated
by a state representative). Sometimes there is little process at all. See Simpson
v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 2005)
(permitting outside clergy to give invocations when chosen by going through
religious congregations listed in the neighborhood phone book).
212. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991).
213. Cf. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 554 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("If the private doctors' confidential advice to their patients at
issue in Rust constituted 'government speech,' it is hard to imagine what sub-
sidized speech would not be government speech.").
214. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288 ("[This issue turns on the characteriza-
tion of the invocations as government speech: . . . 'The invocation is not in-
tended for the exchange of views or other public discourse. Nor is it intended
for the exercise of one's religion."' (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd.
of Supervisors, 292 F. Supp. 2d 805, 819 (E.D. Va. 2003))).
215. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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obtains the power to censor prayers by deciding it wants the
power to censor prayers. The response is that it is indeed circu-
lar reasoning, but that this is a strange doctrinal area which
"grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat."2 1 6
2. The Fairness of Censorship
Yet while the government retains the constitutional power
to censor sectarian prayers, the exercise of this power is deeply
troubling. Those who pray in nondenominational terms can
pray as they would normally. But those who pray in the name
of Jesus are permanently excluded from the prayer opportuni-
ty, precisely because of their religious commitments. 217
Although the government-speech doctrine allows such ex-
clusion, it too is a kind of denominational discrimination. In
Larson v. Valente, the Court considered a Minnesota statute
that imposed certain registration and reporting requirements
on religious organizations that solicited more than half of their
funds from nonmembers. 218 The Supreme Court saw this as an
easy case of denominational discrimination. 2 1 9 Now imagine
such a statute tailored to apply only to religious organizations
that used sectarian references in worship. That would surely be
considered a denominational preference, and just as unconsti-
tutional.220
In the context of legislative prayer, the government-speech
doctrine ratifies this sort of denominational discrimination. As
long as the speech remains governmental, speakers have no
216. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 694
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Randall P. Bezanson, The Govern-
ment Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech Selection
Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 993 (1998) ("Armed with immunities when-
ever it speaks, government might too easily be tempted to expand its authority
by extending its claimed speech activity to the speech of any private persons
with whom it has a relationship.").
217. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. Some Christians
claim a religious duty to pray in the name of Jesus Christ. See, e.g., Brief of
Appellant at 7, Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352 (4th
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1944), 2006 WL 3203326 ("Councilor Turner's deeply held
religious beliefs require him to pray in the name of Jesus Christ.").
218. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 230 (1982).
219. See id. at 246 (holding that the statute "clearly grants denominational
preferences of the sort consistently and firmly deprecated in our precedents").
220. Some have disputed whether it is fair to call this denominational dis-
crimination at all. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 162, at 153-54 ("Such a
definition of discrimination has no support in constitutional jurisprudence.




rights over it; no one has a constitutional right to make the
government pray to Jesus rather than to God. The problem,
however, is that the distinction between governmental and pri-
vate speech gets muddy in the middle, leading many legislative
prayers to be technically classified as government speech even
while they retain certain aspects of private speech. Imagine, for
example, a program inviting a number of outside clergy to pray,
as compared to a program where the same hired chaplain al-
ways prays. As prayers take on aspects of private speech, the
denominational discrimination becomes more and more dis-
quieting-justified by the government-speech doctrine, but
troubling nonetheless.
Part of the trouble relates back to the rationale underlying
the government-speech doctrine. The justification for why the
government is usually allowed unfettered freedom over its
speech has traditionally been that "government speech is sub-
ject to democratic accountability." 221 If you do not like what the
government says about abortion or inflation or beef, you have a
remedy-vote the relevant government officials out of office
and replace them with people who will voice your views in-
stead. 222 This then is the alleged source of the government's
power to exclude Turner from being able to pray. If Turner re-
ally wants to pray, he should go out and win elections.
But this does not make sense on a number of levels. First,
sectarian prayergivers will not be allowed to pray the way they
want, no matter how many elections they win. The nonsecta-
rian standard is a constitutional limitation on governmental
prayer-it is not subject to democratic override. And even if it
were, the general premise that the government's religion
221. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 563 (2005); see also
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ('The latitude which
may exist for restrictions on speech where the government's own message is
being delivered flows in part from our observation that, when the government
speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea,
it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy.").
222. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009)
("[A] government entity is ultimately 'accountable to the electorate and the
political process for its advocacy."' (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys.
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))); Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541-42 ("If
the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different
or contrary position."). For a similar description of the government-speech doc-
trine, see Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government's Religion Pure: Plea-




should be decided by a majority vote contradicts the most basic
of the Court's Religion Clause principles. Over half a century
ago, the Court insisted that matters of religion "may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elec-
tions."2 2 3 Elections work well for some things. If the govern-
ment wants to say things about beef, elections make sense as a
means of determining what should be said.2 2 4 But having elec-
tions as a way of determining the government's position on re-
ligious questions ends up disenfranchising religious minorities
and turning elections into referendums on religion.
Finally, for those unconvinced that there is any real prob-
lem here, it may help to remember that the issue does not just
affect Christian speakers who want to pray in a distinctively
Christian manner. It applies in other contexts as well-it will
affect, for example, those Jews who want to pray in a distinctly
Jewish manner, as well as Muslims who want to pray in a dis-
tinctly Muslim manner. Consider Hinrichs v. Bosma, a case
over whether identifiably Christian prayers were unduly secta-
rian.2 2 5 The district judge there touched off a firestorm when he
offhandedly suggested that legislative prayers addressed to Al-
lah would be constitutionally acceptable because they were suf-
ficiently nonsectarian. 2 2 6 Christian communities understanda-
bly demanded to know why Jesus was impermissible but Allah
somehow was not.2 2 7 Applying the nonsectarian standard ear-
nestly would indeed mean that both sets of such prayers should
be off-limits. Prayers to Allah may seem nonsectarian. In fact,
Christians in other countries pray to Allah-Allah being the
Arabic name for God. 2 2 8 But Christians here in the United
States do not appreciate this point; they do not see the word Al-
lah as being synonymous with the word they use for God. And,
of course, the conclusion that Muslim prayers are unduly secta-
223. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see
also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) ("Simply by
establishing this school-related procedure, which entrusts the inherently non-
governmental subject of religion to a majoritarian vote, a constitutional viola-
tion has occurred.").
224. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (applying the government-speech doc-
trine to statements about beef advertising).
225. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 395-96 (7th Cir. 2006).
226. Hinrichs v. Bosma, No. 105-0813, 2005 WL 3544300, at *7 (S.D. Ind.
Dec. 28, 2005).
227. This was the entire focus of one amicus brief. See, e.g., Brief for Theo-
logians and Scholars of Religion as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra
note 142, at 22.
228. See Delahunty, supra note 141, at 546.
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rian is deeply discomforting. Particularly in an age where
Americans strive for good relations in the Muslim world, ex-
cluding Muslims from prayer opportunities because they pray
like Muslims seems both cruel and self-defeating.
G. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OBJECTION
Before concluding our discussion of the nonsectarian re-
quirement, we should add a word about originalism. It is telling
how little it is mentioned in these cases, but occasionally par-
ties do claim that a proper respect for originalism demands
that sectarian references be tolerated. In one case, the United
States itself (somewhat surprisingly) claimed that "Marsh re-
quires reversal [of a judgment striking down sectarian prayer]
because the practice of legislative prayer the Supreme Court
validated in that case, based on longstanding history and tradi-
tion, has always included sectarian references."229 It is surely
true that the history of legislative prayer has included secta-
rian references. 230 But this proves far too much. This concep-
tion of originalism would mean removing all restrictions on the
content of legislative prayer-for there is no evidence of any
constitutional tradition barring proselytizing or disparaging
prayers either.231 A better originalism would have to deal with
229. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States of America, supra note
145 at 8.
230. See supra Part L.A (explaining how the nonsectarian standard is in-
consistent with the history behind legislative prayer); see also Epstein, supra
note 68, at 2104 ("[W]ithin the last six years alone, over two hundred and fifty
opening prayers delivered by congressional chaplains have included supplica-
tions to Jesus Christ.").
As another example, the prayers and columns of one congressional chap-
lain were bound together and published. Many of those prayers are quite poe-
tic and moving. But many are sectarian, in the sense of referring to Jesus de-
votionally. See, e.g., FREDERICK BROWN HARRIS, SENATE PRAYERS AND SPIRES
OF THE SPIRIT 16 (1970) ("In Jesus' name."); id. at 18 ("In the dear Redeemer's
name."); id. at 31 ("[In Christ Jesus, our Lord."); id. at 34 ("In Christ's con-
quering name we pray."); id. at 36 ("[Inn the name of Jesus Christ, our Lord.");
id. at 41 ("[I]n the name of the risen Christ . . . ."). Other religious leaders, it
should be noted, spoke well of Rev. Harris. See id. at 9 (reporting a statement
by Rabbi Normal Gerstenfield that, "to [Gerstenfield,] Reverend Harris is the
anchor man on the American spiritual team").
231. Even imprecatory prayers-that is, prayers that openly seek the mis-
fortune of others-would have to be allowed. For example, several years ago, a
guest chaplain before the Kansas legislature gave a withering prayer to which
many in the legislature objected as imprecatory. See Grace Hobson, Prayer
Provokes Passions: Wichitan's Message Upsets Kansas House, WICHITA EAGLE,
Jan. 24, 1996, at lA, available at 1996 WLNR 9174190 ("We confess we have
ridiculed the absolute truth of your word and called it moral pluralism . . .We
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the principle of denominational discrimination almost undenia-
bly made a part of the Establishment Clause, 232 from which the
ban on sectarian references seems to flow easily. And Marsh
too sidelines originalism on this point. For while it applied
principles of originalism in its upholding of the chaplaincies,
the restrictions Marsh imposed on legislative prayer were not
grounded in those same principles.233
H. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS
The nonsectarian standard has virtues and vices that are
sometimes obvious and sometimes obscure. Its chief virtue is
that it seems the only workable solution to the problem of de-
nominational exclusivity, a problem that the Court has recog-
nized as a core concern of the Establishment Clause. Its chief
vice is the unfair censorship it requires. There is no obviously
superior alternative, and there seems to be no way of separat-
ing the vice from the virtue. 234 In a way though, this should
create some common ground. We all can agree that Marsh has
placed us in a position from which it is impossible to steer a
truly neutral course. Religious liberty for all cannot really be
served in any legislative prayer scheme. Such a conclusion
should propel us to reconsider Marsh, a line of thought that
will be examined in more detail in the last Part of this Article.
have worshipped other gods and called it multiculturalism. We have endorsed
perversion and called it an alternative lifestyle. We have exploited the poor
and called it the lottery. We have neglected the needy and called it self-
preservation. We have rewarded laziness and called it welfare. We have killed
our unborn and called it choice. We have shot abortionists and called it justifi-
able."). This prayer was widely circulated, and when it was given eight years
later in a council meeting of a small Pennsylvania town, the town voted to re-
ject having prayer altogether. See Reid Kanaley, Downingtown Council Rejects
Prayer, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 24, 2004, at Bi, available at 2004 WLNR
19392569.
232. See supra Part II.E.
233. One could draw an analogy to the Supreme Court's recent decision in
D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), where the Court issued an opinion
grounded in originalism, but made several exceptions to its rule that seem to
have little justification within originalism. See, e.g., Brian Leiter's Legal Phi-
losophy Blog, http://leiterlegalphilosophy.typepad.com/leiter/2008/06/a-puzzle
-about.html (June 27, 2008).
234. Another alternative solution, the idea of the public forum, will be con-
sidered and rejected later. See infra Part IV.
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III. PROTECTING SPEAKERS: THE IMPERMISSIBLE
MOTIVE REQUIREMENT
We now turn to the other requirement laid out in Marsh,
the "impermissible motive" requirement. While the nonsecta-
rian standard seeks to protect listeners, the impermissible mo-
tive requirement seeks to protect speakers by forbidding gov-
ernments from picking and choosing among potential
prayergivers on the basis of their religious affiliations.
As discussed earlier, the plaintiff in Marsh attacked legis-
lative prayer generally, but also attacked specific facets of Ne-
braska's chaplaincy, one of which related to the content of the
chaplain's prayers.235 Another specific charge leveled against
Nebraska's chaplaincy was that the Presbyterian minister, Ro-
bert Palmer, had held the post for sixteen years. 236 . To the
plaintiff, this was evidence of governmental support not just for
religion, but for Presbyterianism in particular. 237 But the Su-
preme Court responded with the following passage:
The Court of Appeals was concerned that Palmer's long tenure has
the effect of giving preference to his religious views. We cannot, any
more than Members of the Congresses of this century, perceive any
suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one denomination advances
the beliefs of a particular church. To the contrary, the evidence indi-
cates that Palmer was reappointed because his performance and per-
sonal qualities were acceptable to the body appointing him. . . . Ab-
sent proof that the chaplain's reappointment stemmed from an
impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not in it-
self conflict with the Establishment Clause.238
The general gist of this passage is clear-the fact that
Palmer was a Presbyterian did not mean that Palmer was se-
lected because he was a Presbyterian. The latter would be un-
constitutional. But the former is fine. Indeed, the former is in-
evitable, as prayergivers will always be from some particular
denomination. 239 Because Palmer was not selected because of
"his religious views," but rather because "his performance and
personal qualities were acceptable," the Court found no consti-
tutional problem with his long tenure.240
235. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 793-94 (footnote omitted).
239. Cf. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998)
(en banc) ("[This genre of government religious activity cannot exist without
the government actually selecting someone to offer such prayers....
240. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94.
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This language can be taken too seriously. Taken without
context and common sense, it can suggest that chaplains now
must be chosen on a strictly religion-neutral basis. This would
indeed be hard to imagine. When it comes to getting a job as a
congressional chaplain, a Jewish rabbi almost assuredly does
not stand on equal ground with a comparably credentialed
mainline Protestant minister. After all, we have had hundreds
of Protestant chaplains and no Jewish ones. 2 4 1 This is only cir-
cumstantial evidence, but of an awfully persuasive sort. Any
employment discrimination lawyer would take that case. 2 4 2
And surely no one thinks that Wiccan and Christian ministers
have equal chances of being hired as congressional chaplains.
Realistically speaking, we could not expect it to be other-
wise. Deep down, we all know that Congress does not (and
probably cannot) truly divorce a chaplain's "performance and
personal qualities" from his religiosity, so any suggestion that
Congress must choose chaplains based on purely secular crite-
ria seems sensible but is entirely unrealistic. All this is to say
that Marsh surely intended a degree of judicial underenforce-
ment here. Yet despite that, the clear import of the passage is
that government does not have an unrestricted ability to go
picking and choosing prayergivers on the basis of their religious
denominations.
The impermissible motive requirement has been the focus
of two federal appellate cases that came to opposite conclusions
as to its meaning. One case, Pelphrey, concerned the prayer
practice of the Cobb County Planning Commission, which had a
long tradition of having volunteer clergy open meetings with
prayer. 243 The deputy clerk of the Planning Commission com-
piled a list of available clergy from various sources, including
the Yellow Pages.244 This list, however, excluded certain reli-
gious groups-when the clerk's phone book was turned over in
discovery, it was revealed that she had crossed out the catego-
ries of "Churches-Islamic," "Churches-Jehovah's Witnesses,"
241. See Lund, supra note 44, at 1203.
242. This is an example of the "inexorable zero," sometimes referred to as a
hallmark of guilt in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) ("[Fline tuning of
the statistics could not have obscured the glaring absence of minority [bus]
drivers... . [The company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination
came not from a misuse of statistics but from 'the inexorable zero."' (citation
omitted)).




"Churches-Jewish," and "Churches-Latter Day Saints."2 4 5 Cler-
gy from all the other denominations were invited to participate
in the legislative prayer program, but clergy from those deno-
minations were not.246
The other case, Simpson, dealt with the prayer policy of
the Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors. 247 Chesterfield
County also had a policy of opening meetings with a prayer
from a local clergyperson. 248 But instead of creating an official
list, Chesterfield County opened up the opportunity to volun-
teers.249 Cynthia Simpson, a local Wiccan with a leadership role
in her religious community, wrote the Board asking for her
turn.250 The Board wrote back to her, explaining that "Chester-
field's non-sectarian invocations are traditionally made to a di-
vinity that is consistent with the Judeo-Christian tradition"
and that "[b]ased upon our review of Wicca, it is neo-pagan and
invokes polytheistic, pre-Christian deities."25 1 As a result, the
Board rejected her request to be on the list of prayergivers. 252
Pelphrey and Simpson adopt quite different approaches to
the impermissible motive requirement. The Eleventh Circuit in
Pelphrey explained it along the lines of the quoted paragraph
from Marsh. The requirement, the Court said, was "directed at
the conscious selection of a speaker from one denomination or
sect for the purpose of promoting or endorsing the beliefs held
by that speaker." 253 What was "constitutionally unacceptable"
was "the selection and retention of a particular speaker because
of that speaker's sectarian affiliation or religious beliefs." 2 5 4 As
245. Id. at 1267.
246. See id. at 1267-68.
247. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278-
80 (4th Cir. 2005).
248. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 292 F. Supp.
2d 805, 807 (E.D. Va. 2003), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 404 F.3d 276 (4th
Cir. 2005).
249. See id.
250. See id. at 808.
251. See id.
252. Id. ("Accordingly, we cannot honor your request to be included on the
list of religious leaders that are invited to provide invocations at the meetings
of the Board of Supervisors.").
253. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (ci-




such, Cobb County's exclusion of Mormon, Jewish, Islamic, and
Jehovah's Witness clergy was unconstitutional. 2 5 5
The Fourth Circuit in Simpson, however, took a very dif-
ferent position. It dismissed Simpson's claim with a very
straightforward logic. Given that Marsh upheld Nebraska's
practice of having a single Presbyterian chaplain give prayers
for sixteen years, surely Chesterfield County could adopt a
more inclusive policy that included at least some other religious
groups-that is, Baptists, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, but not
Wiccans. That the more ecumenical policy would be the uncons-
titutional one, the Court reasoned, "would achieve a particular-
ly perverse result."256
The Eleventh Circuit's approach is the better one, for the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Simpson simply does not square
with the Court's discussion of the impermissible motive re-
quirement in Marsh. Marsh again took pains to explain why
Palmer's selection did not reflect any denominational discrimi-
nation. Palmer was chosen not because he was Presbyterian,
but because he was the best candidate for the job. Simpson, by
contrast, was rejected precisely because of her theological be-
liefs.25 7 She was the only one rejected, and the letter rejecting
her specified that it was her religious denomination that was
the basis for her exclusion.258 Simpson's logic suggests that lo-
cal governments have unbridled discretion to pick and choose
prayergivers on all manner of religious criteria-Chesterfield
County could choose Christians but not Jews, Protestants but
not Catholics, or Lutherans but not Baptists. Simpson seems to
255. See id. at 1282 ("[W]e agree with the district court that the categorical
exclusion of certain faiths based on their beliefs is unconstitutional.").
256. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 287
(4th Cir. 2005).
257. On a related point, the Board was also mistaken about what Simp-
son's religious beliefs actually were. The Board, in its letter, assumed that be-
cause Simpson was Wiccan, she was not monotheistic. This, however, was in-
correct. See id. at 280 ("Simpson identified herself as 'a monotheistic witch'
who believes in the goddess . . . .").
258. There was no argument that Simpson's prayer was properly excluded
because it was sectarian, proselytizing, or disparaging. See Simpson v. Ches-
terfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 292 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (E.D. Va. 2003)
("Plaintiff was prepared to present a non-sectarian invocation espousing basic
values consistent with general themes about life, death, and creation, and
about how to live a good and ethical life." (citations and quotations omitted)).
At the time Simpson sued, it was unclear whether there was a nonsectarian
requirement in the Fourth Circuit; that requirement was adopted in another




vitiate the impermissible motive requirement altogether; it is
hard to imagine a clearer case of denominational discrimina-
tion than what happened to Cynthia Simpson.259
Of course, Simpson and Pelphrey are both instances of
extraordinarily explicit religious discrimination. When Chief
Justice Burger drafted the impermissible motive requirement,
he surely imagined that it would largely go unenforced by the
judiciary-it is hard to imagine a candidate for a single perma-
nent state or congressional chaplaincy ever being able to dem-
onstrate religious discrimination with the necessary clarity.260
With rotating chaplaincies, the impermissible motive require-
ment develops more teeth. Yet even so, both Pelphrey and
Simpson underscore how difficult impermissible motives will be
in practice to prove. In Pelphrey, the governmental defendant
documented, and then preserved, evidence proving its own im-
permissible motives; in Simpson, the government actually
mailed that evidence to the plaintiff. In general, it will be very
difficult for plaintiffs to win these cases, particularly once de-
259. Perhaps the best diagnosis of Simpson comes from Judge McConnell:
If members of minority religions (or other cultural groups) feel ex-
cluded by government symbols or speech, the best solution is to re-
quest fair treatment of alternative traditions, rather than censorship
of more mainstream symbols. If a government refuses to cooperate
with minority religious (and other cultural) groups within the com-
munity, there may be a basis for inferring that the choice of symbols
was a deliberate attempt to use government influence to promote a
particular religious position. Courts should not encourage the prolif-
eration of litigation by offering the false hope that perfect neutrality
can be achieved. . . . [But c]ertainly they should not allow official acts
that declare one religion, or group of religions, superior to the rest....
McConnell, supra note 121, at 193-94. McConnell wrote this passage fifteen
years before Simpson, but it reads well even today as a defense of her claim.
260. Several other courts have entertained claims by would-be chaplains
who claimed they were rejected for essentially theological reasons. These chal-
lenges were all rebuffed on grounds of insufficient proof. See Bogen v. Doty,
598 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting a challenge to legislative prayer
because "[w]e have no reason to believe that persons of any religious persua-
sions have volunteered and been turned down by the board[,]" but "[i]f in the
future this should occur the board will be in a very difficult position to defend
against an allegation that it is excessively entangled in religion by giving pub-
lic approval to some groups while denying it to others"); Soc'y of Separation-
ists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 939 (Utah 1993) (rejecting a challenge to
legislative prayer because the plaintiffs "have not shown that the City Council
favored particular religions" because "the record indicates that the City Coun-
cil made efforts to assure that a broad cross-section of the community was
represented"); Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1199
(Mass. 1979) (upholding the appointment of two Catholic chaplains as there
was no evidence that "such decisions were based on religious discrimination").
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fendants begin to recognize the need to conceal their imper-
missible motives.
IV. PROTECTING LISTENERS AND SPEAKERS: THE
PUBLIC FORUM AS IMPOSSIBLE IDEAL
Though Marsh itself did not explain them this way, the two
restrictions aim to make legislative prayer as nonpreferential
as possible. Listeners are protected by the nonsectarian limita-
tion; speakers are protected by the impermissible motive limi-
tation. At first blush, the two limitations appear to be comple-
mentary safeguards, entitling both speakers and listeners
protection against denominational discrimination. But while
these two limitations are partially reinforcing, they are also
partially contradictory.
To put it another way, in the impermissible motive and
nonsectarian restrictions, Marsh contains the seeds of two en-
tirely different notions of legislative prayer. If we want to pro-
tect listeners (as the nonsectarian standard does), we will make
legislative prayer as inoffensive and generic as possible, be-
cause that will offend the fewest listeners. Prayers that have
divisive content, or that come from divisive people, are incon-
sistent with that premise and are properly excluded. But if we
want to protect speakers (as the impermissible motive standard
does), we will free speakers from all restrictions, entitling any-
one to offer whatever sort of prayer they think appropriate.
These two visions thus partially contradict each other. In a
sense, one tries to minimize the establishment of religion, while
the other tries to partition it equally. The two limitations could
be adopted together, but this would mean only partial protec-
tion for both listeners and speakers. Listeners would be pro-
tected from offensive content (because of the nonsectarian re-
quirement), but would have to tolerate offensive speakers
(because of the impermissible motive requirement). Speakers
would be protected in terms of their affiliation (the impermissi-
ble motive requirement), but not in terms of the content of their
prayers (the nonsectarian requirement). Here again, we face
the familiar dilemma-to increase protection for speakers, we
must decrease protection for listeners and vice-versa. And
again, religious liberty within the sphere of legislative prayer
looks like a zero-sum game.
One persistent question has been whether it is possible to
go further-to completely protect both speakers and listeners.
This is the idea of the public forum. Some have suggested that
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the public-forum concept can solve the problems associated
with legislative prayer. 261 This idea has understandable appeal.
If the public-forum idea could be extended to legislative prayer,
it would mean that the resulting prayers would be private, ra-
ther than public, speech. Speakers would have constitutional
rights both to speak and to say what they like. And listeners
would be protected in the sense that they would recognize the
speech as not coming from the government, but from their fel-
low private citizens. In fact, not only would government not be
responsible for this speech, government would lack the power
to stop it.
Unfortunately however, as this section shows, the public-
forum idea will simply not work. The problems here are many,
but they are traceable back to one simple fact: public forums
require government to give up control, and no government will
likely be willing to give up this much control over legislative
prayer.
We start with some basics regarding public forums. The
government can create a public forum by designating a place as
a forum for private speakers to assemble and speak.262 The
government can lay down rules regarding who can speak at the
forum and what they can say. But the rules have to be content
and viewpoint-neutral. 263 And, once they are set, the govern-
ment becomes bound by those rules, and has to permit all
speakers and all speech that satisfies them.2 6 4 Public forums
261. As will be discussed below, this idea was pushed the furthest in Hin-
richs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006). See, e.g., Reply Brief for the De-
fendant-Appellant Brian Bosma, Hinrichs, 440 F.3d 393 (No. 05-46040), 2006
WL 4820661; Brief of Amici Curiae Indiana Family Institute, Inc. et al. in
Support of Speaker Bosma Seeking Reversal, Hinrichs, 440 F.3d 393 (No. 05-
4604), 2006 WL 4820683; Brief of Advance America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendant-Appellant, Hinrichs, 440 F.3d 393 (No. 05-4604), 2006
WL 4820687.
262. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985) ("[A] public forum may be created by government designation of a
place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly
and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain sub-
jects.").
263. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
830 (1995) (explaining that content discrimination is permitted only "to pre-
serve the purposes of th[e] limited forum" and viewpoint discrimination is
never permitted).
264. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)
("If the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a




are not created by inaction or by allowing a few people to speak;
rather, they are only created when the government deliberately
makes a space generally available to an entire class of speak-
ers. 2 65 Finally, when a public forum is created, the resulting
speech becomes private, and the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause no longer apply. 2 66
Thus, the first step in creating a public forum is defining
the limits of the forum by choosing the topic of the forum and
the class of speakers that will be permitted to participate. And
at this very first step, we can begin to see the deep incompati-
bility between legislative prayer and public-forum doctrine.
Consider again Hinrichs v. Bosma, in which a plaintiff chal-
lenged sectarian prayers given at sessions of the Indiana Legis-
lature. 267 The defendants raised several arguments to save
their practice of legislative prayer, including the standard ar-
gument that sectarian prayers are not unconstitutional. 2 6 8 But
the defendants and their amici also raised a public-forum ar-
gument. They argued that the government had created a li-
mited public forum, and was thus no longer constitutionally re-
sponsible for what was said.269 This was private speech, they
argued, not public speech. And thus the government could not
stop sectarian speakers even if it so desired.270 Most important
265. See id. at 678 ("To create a forum of this type, the government must
intend to make the property 'generally available' . . . to a class of speakers."
(citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981))); see also Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 802 ("The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontradi-
tional forum for public discourse.").
266. This at least seems to be the current position of the Court. In Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, four Justices suggested that when
the government creates a public forum for private speech, it is no longer re-
sponsible for the religious content of that speech. See 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995)
(plurality opinion) ("Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or desig-
nated public forum publicly announced and open to all on equal terms."). Sev-
eral Justices were somewhat more reserved, and suggested that the govern-
ment had a duty to ensure the forum not only was opened equally, but also
operated equally. See id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that, for
the connection to be cut, it must be the case that "truly private speech is al-
lowed on equal terms in a vigorous public forum that the government has ad-
ministered properly"). However, this detail is not essential, as it is clear that
the creation of a true public forum will usually be enough to cut the govern-
ment's connection to the speech.
267. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006).
268. See Reply Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 261, at 1.
269. See id. at 11.
270. See id. at 12.
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here was the defendants' definition of the public forum. The de-
fendants and their amici argued that the government had
created a public forum specifically for prayer, and thus anyone
who wanted to offer a prayer would have a right to speak before
the Indiana legislature. But no one would have any right to of-
fer anything that was not a prayer.271
This whole argument, however, is premised on a deep mis-
understanding of public-forum doctrine. 272 This misunderstand-
ing becomes clear when one reconsiders the long line of cases
involving religious organizations suing for equal access to pub-
lic spaces.273 In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, for
example, a local school district had excluded a Christian club
from meeting on elementary school property after school. 274
While the school district generally allowed after-school clubs to
meet and admitted that it had created a public forum for some
clubs to meet,2 7 5 it claimed that Good News Club was properly
excluded from the forum because of its religious nature. The
Supreme Court disagreed. "[T]he exclusion of the Club on the
basis of its religious perspective," the Court explained, "consti-
tutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination."276 The mes-
sage of Good News was clear-the government cannot define
the subject matter of a forum so as to exclude religion. 277
But if excluding religious viewpoints on a topic while per-
mitting secular ones is viewpoint discrimination, it must also
271. See id. at 11 ('In this context, the forum may be limited to prayer.");
Brief of Indiana Family Institute et al., supra note 261, at 12 ("The Indiana
House Has Limited The Forum To Prayer."); Brief of Advance America, Inc.,
supra note 261, at 5 ("[The government [can open] a forum for a particular
limited type of activity-to prayer in this case. . . .").
272. This argument was not addressed by the Seventh Circuit, which
ended up dismissing the case on standing grounds. See Hinrichs v. Speaker of
House of Rep. of Ind. Gen. Assem., 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).
273. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
274. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98.
275. See id. at 106 ("[T]he parties have agreed that Milford created a li-
mited public forum."); id. at 108 ("Milford has opened its limited public forum
to activities that serve a variety of purposes . . . [and] interprets its policy to
permit discussions of subjects such as child rearing, and 'of the development of
character and morals."').
276. Id. at 108 n.2.
277. See id. at 110 (holding that "the exclusion of the Good News Club's ac-
tivities . . . constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination"). For a
thoughtful view critical of the Good News line of cases, see Nelson Tebbe, Ex-
cluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008).
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be viewpoint discrimination to exclude secular viewpoints on a
topic while permitting religious ones. If it violates equality to
treat religious speech worse than secular speech, it violates
equality just as much to treat it better. To put this another
way, government simply cannot define the subject matter of the
forum in terms of religion. The forum cannot be set up either to
exclude religious speech altogether or to insist that all the
speech in the forum be religious.
What this means, of course, is there cannot be a public fo-
rum for legislative prayer specifically. The forum cannot be de-
fined in religious terms; a "religious public forum" is a constitu-
tional oxymoron. Now, one can try to define the forum's subject
matter in secular terms. The best attempt would be to define
the forum's subject matter by reference to the secular functions
that legislative prayer is supposed to serve-formally opening
the session, solemnizing the proceedings, and unifying the at-
tendees.278 The point here would be to enable individual speak-
ers to give solemnizing prayers and other messages, but still
entitle the government to stop speakers from delivering reli-
gious harangues or going entirely off-topic.
Yet defining the subject matter of the public forum in this
way still presents a problem. For it is hardly viewpoint neutral
to allow only "solemnizing" speech. It is, in fact, just a clever
gerrymander-an attempt to subvert the prohibition on view-
point discrimination by building the discrimination into the de-
finition of the forum's subject matter. This area of the law is
unclear; the Court has never given a complete explanation of
what viewpoint neutrality means.279 But, at the very least, it
requires opposing viewpoints to be treated equally. Secular
speech cannot be excluded while religious speech is permitted;
speech by Democrats cannot be preferred over speech by Re-
publicans. Permitting unifying speech requires permitting
speech that questions the need for unity; permitting legislative
prayer requires permitting speech questioning the appro-
priateness of legislative prayer. A public forum that allows the
Lord's Prayer must indeed allow the prayer of the citizen who
wants to distort it by opening, "Our Mother, who art in heaven
278. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the "secular functions legislative prayer might play"
include "formally opening the legislative session, getting the members of the
body to quiet down, and imbuing them with a sense of seriousness and high
purpose").
279. See supra note 195.
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(if, indeed there is a heaven and if there is a god that takes a
woman's form), hallowed be thy name."280
Much can be learned from the litigation in Santa Fe Inde-
pendent School District v. Doe.281 In that case, a school district
had a policy allowing the student body to select a speaker to of-
fer an invocation before school football games. One of the de-
fenses raised by the school district and its amici was that it had
created a public forum for invocations.282 There too, the school
district tried to build a public forum around the idea of solem-
nizing speech-the school's policy explained that invocations
were "to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship
and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environ-
ment for the competition."283 But this was again a rigged public
forum. Students could only solemnize; they could not be flip-
pant or iconoclastic. They could promote good sportsmanship,
but they could not attack it or question its meaning. The
school's policy said that invocations were to "establish the ap-
propriate environment for the competition," but it was not up to
the students to decide what environment to establish. The gov-
ernment had already decided that-the subject matter of the
forum dictated to the students what their viewpoint was to
be. 2 84 For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit rejected the defen-
dants' claim of a public forum, and the Supreme Court never
took the claim seriously. 285
All of this applies to public forums being built around the
idea of legislative prayer, and it explains why the public-forum
doctrine is not an easy fix to the legislative prayer conundrum.
280. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1228 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998).
281. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
282. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 818-22 (5th Cir.
1999) (rejecting the public forum argument); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., 530 U.S. at 302-04.
283. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 834 n.17 (Jolly, J., dissent-
ing).
284. See Brief of Respondents at 17, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S.
290 (2000) (No. 99-62), 2000 WL 140928 ("Neither a parody, nor a math les-
son, nor the school's latest gossip, nor a demand to fire the football coach, nor
an attack on the school board, nor a political stump speech, nor a discussion of
this Court's cases, nor a disquisition on any other controversial issue would
serve the stated purposes of the Football Policy. . . . [This] is certainly not an
opportunity for robust and uninhibited debate.").
285. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302-04 (rejecting the pub-
lic forum argument); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 818-22 (same).
The dissent in the Supreme Court, which took the school district's side, did not
advance this argument. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 318-26 &
nn.1-5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The public-forum doctrine requires the government to give up
virtually all control over the resulting speech. Not only will the
government have to tolerate all kinds of legislative prayer-
even those that are disparaging and proselytizing-it cannot
even draw a line at prayer altogether. It will have to allow en-
tirely secular invocations. It will have to have to allow speeches
that question the appropriateness of legislative prayer, and
speeches that reject prayer altogether.
Legislative bodies will naturally hesitate before permitting
such speeches. Yet we should not dismiss the possibility out of
hand; it has happened in practice at least once. After the
Pelphrey litigation, the Cobb County Board of Commissioners
adopted such a policy, even allowing an atheist to give an invo-
cation. The atheist used the time to speak out against govern-
mental endorsements of religion, calling his invocation "a pro-
test against invocations." 286 But he apparently was not
interrupted nor sanctioned afterwards, although the Board
Chairman later called his comments "repugnant and insult-
ing."2 87 Yet this sort of approach will have a hard time gaining
much traction. Most local governments will view it as a last
resort-something to be adopted only if all other possible legis-
lative prayer formats somehow become impossible. Yet were it
to gain widespread acceptance, for the reasons explained above,
the public forum approach could well be the ideal solution to
the problems posed by legislative prayer.288
V. THE PERILS OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT:
LEGISLATIVE PRAYER AS CASE STUDY
These modern battles over legislative prayer are interest-
ing in themselves and for the light they cast on the Establish-
ment Clause. But they also offer a glimpse into an alternate
constitutional reality-one where the neutrality principle has
faded and mild religious establishments (like legislative prayer)
thrive. In future years as the Court changes, this alternative
reality may become more and more a possibility. In this sense,
286. See Marcus K. Garner, Atheist Gives Invocation at Cobb Meeting, AT-
LANTA J.-CONST., July 30, 2009.
287. Id.
288. For another example of a jurisdiction considering a public forum ap-
proach, see Malia Wollen & Jesse McKinley, City Decides to Continue Pre-
Meeting Invocation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at A17, available at 2009 WLNR




the modern legislative prayer cases may end up serving as ca-
naries in the mine-the first warnings about the unforeseen
and tragic consequences that can accompany superficially inno-
cuous religious endorsements.
A. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER AND THE CURRENT CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM
The neutrality principle has been the law for fifty years,
but people still question its legitimacy. Indeed, it is probably
more controversial now than at any other point in that fifty-
year period. Several Justices now openly reject it.289 And even
moderate Justices, judges, and commentators now seem willing
to tolerate at least some religious endorsements. That list of
names is long, and it includes some prominent figures in consti-
tutional law-Judge Richard Posner, 290 Steven Smith,291 Noah
Feldman,292 Richard Schragger,293 Eugene Volokh,294 and Ri-
chard Garnett.295 They do not share identical views of the Es-
tablishment Clause. But they do seem to share the idea that
the courts should tolerate at least some, and possibly quite
many, endorsements of religion.296
Part of it is that they see little actual harm in these en-
dorsements. Dissenters can often avoid passive displays, like
Christmas displays and Ten Commandments monuments, by
walking around them or by averting their eyes. 2 9 7 And religious
289. This was not always the case. See Laycock, supra note 30, at 61 (ex-
plaining how, at the time of Marsh, only a single Justice rejected the neutrali-
ty principle).
290. See Posner, supra note 5.
291. See SMITH, supra note 6.
292. See FELDMAN, supra note 7.
293. See Schragger, supra note 8.
294. See Posting of Volokh, supra note 9.
295. See Garnett, supra note 10.
296. The Supreme Court's most recent forays in this area were two cases
about Ten Commandments displays and one case about the phrase "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Most of the commentary above is addressed
at those cases. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County
v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1 (2004).
297. Indeed, in passive-display cases, plaintiffs sometimes lose on the thre-
shold of standing, simply because they have not had regular contact with the
display being challenged. See ACLU-NJ v. Twp. of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 266 (3d
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Alito, J.) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge a display because one plaintiff had not seen the display and the oth-




endorsements that cannot be avoided outright-like, say,
prayer at a public school graduation and the phrase "under
God" in the Pledge-can be ignored. Dissenters can just treat
them simply as social facts about our culture; they can choose
not to take offense at them. 2 9 8 Much of the time, the religious
message is surrounded, and thus diluted, by secular messages
anyway. 299 For these reasons, Professor Schragger has called
these cases "sideshows"-they are, he says, "much less conse-
quential than [other Establishment Clause issues, such as] the
funneling of government funds into religious coffers or the
wholesale exemption of religious institutions from local regula-
tory regimes." 300
Part of it also is that these commentators see real harm
arising when long-standing endorsements are challenged. The
old view, of course, was that it was religious endorsements
themselves that created political-religious conflict and divi-
sion.301 But that conventional wisdom too has now flipped.
Striking down religious endorsements is now seen not as the
solution to political strife, but as a cause of it.302 Few used to
care about the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance. But
when the Ninth Circuit held it unconstitutional in 2003, a pub-
lic outcry erupted. 303 Had the Supreme Court affirmed the
298. See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 242 (arguing that governmental en-
dorsements really only reflect that a certain religious group makes up a major-
ity in the community, and that "it is largely an interpretative choice to feel ex-
cluded by the fact of other people's faith"); see also id. at 240 ("Just what is
threatening to religious minorities about Christians celebrating the [Christ-
mas] holiday and the state acknowledging that fact?").
299. Judge Posner makes this point regarding Ten Commandment dis-
plays. See Posner, supra note 5, at 101 ("Most of the Commandments are not
explicitly religious, and those that are get the least attention-who has been
worrying lately about graven images, or even about taking the Lord's name in
vain?").
300. Schragger, supra note 8, at 1881.
301. This view still has some sway. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (holding that the school policy encouraging foot-
ball-game prayer "encourages divisiveness along religious lines"); id. at 311
("The mechanism encourages divisiveness along religious lines in a public
school setting, a result at odds with the Establishment Clause.").
302. See Richard W. Garnett, "Modest Expectations'?: Civic Unity, Reli-
gious Pluralism, and Conscience, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 246 (2006) (re-
viewing FELDMAN, supra note 7) (summarizing Feldman's view as being that
the Court's "aggressive[] policing [of] public religious expression, symbols, and
displays .... is making things worse").
303. See Steven G. Gey, "Under God," the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other
Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865, 1866-68 & nn.2-5 (2003) (sum-
marizing the political controversy).
2010] 1037
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Ninth Circuit's judgment, we could have expected contentious
struggles in both Congress and in state legislatures over
whether to adopt a constitutional amendment reversing the de-
cision (or perhaps going even further). Measured solely in
terms of quieting nerves, the Supreme Court's decision that
Newdow lacked standing surely makes a certain sense. 304
This situation was made even more explicit a year later,
when the Court considered a pair of Ten Commandments dis-
plays. 305 Justice Breyer surprised everyone in a separate opi-
nion affirming the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments
display on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. 306 Breyer ex-
plained that he saw the issue as a close one, because the Ten
Commandments had both deep secular and religious mean-
ing. 3 0 7 Speaking with a frankness that Supreme Court Justices
usually eschew, Breyer acknowledged that though a govern-
ment-sponsored Ten Commandments display is indeed divisive,
striking down the display would probably be even more so. 30 8
Breyer's vote to uphold the display was condemned by some,
but praised by others. 309
Especially in the past decade, this view-the view that re-
ligious endorsements are better tolerated than uprooted-has
taken deeper roots in our constitutional culture. But it is not, of
course, entirely new. It existed twenty-five years ago; Chief
Justice Burger's opinion in Marsh reads in many ways like Jus-
tice Breyer's Van Orden opinion. Like Breyer, Burger surely be-
lieved that the best way of maintaining societal peace-the best
way of making these disputes go away-was by approving the
endorsement in question. But twenty-five years worth of histo-
ry call into question this wisdom, or at least temper it signifi-
304. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004).
305. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005); Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
306. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698-705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(providing the fifth vote).
307. See id. at 700-01 (explaining that this was "a borderline case," largely
because "the Ten Commandments can convey not simply a religious message
but also a secular moral message").
308. See id. at 704 ("[A] holding [striking down the Ten Commandments]
might well encourage disputes concerning the removal of longstanding depic-
tions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings across the Nation. And
it could thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.").
309. See Posner, supra note 5, at 100 ("It is hard to imagine not only a
more divisive, but also a more doctrinaire and even absurd project [than the
decision striking down the Ten Commandments display in Van Orden].").
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cantly. Legislative prayer has not gone away; it has led to con-
tinual controversy and concomitant division. This next section
explores why, trying to articulate with some precision the roots
of the problem.
B. WHAT MAKES LEGISLATIVE PRAYER DIFFERENT
The question then is why legislative prayer has developed
into such a morass. The core of it seems to be that legislative
prayer vests government with vast discretion. Legislatures do
not simply decide to have legislative prayer; legislative prayer
requires organization. Government must necessarily make a
number of religious choices-not just whether to have legisla-
tive prayer, but how often, for how long, and so on. Most impor-
tant, of course, are the choices the government must make
about delegation-who will have the right to speak and what
exactly will they be allowed to say? These decisions, as Justice
Brennan saw long ago, require government to make a number
of uncomfortable decisions. 310 They require the government to
formulate prayer policies, and state and local governments will
have to spend time drafting and debating the comparative wis-
dom of different options.311
The first question is who should be given the right to pray.
Local governments could simply allow everyone to pray in a
first-come, first-served format. But this poses problems. There
are usually too many people who would want to pray and too
few prayer opportunities. Moreover, there are inevitably some
speakers whom audiences would find distasteful, and others
who would take advantage of the situation in a way few people
would want. 312 Sensitive people will try to allocate the prayer
310. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 799 (1983) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) ("In the case of legislative prayer, the process of choosing a 'suitable'
chaplain, whether on a permanent or rotating basis, and insuring that the
chaplain limits himself or herself to 'suitable' prayers, involves precisely the
sort of supervision that agencies of government should if at all possible
avoid.").
311. The Alliance Defense Fund, for example, has remarkably detailed
model legislative prayer policies, tailored to the law of each federal circuit.
ADF offers model policies both for having prayer performed by local officials
and for prayer performed by invited clergy. See, e.g., Open Letter from Al-
liance Def. Fund to Interested Parties Regarding the Legality of Public Invoca-
tions (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/user
docs/fpc/Circuit5_General.pdf.
312. See e.g., Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1228 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1998) (involving a plaintiff who sought to present a prayer beginning,
"Our Mother, who art in heaven (if, indeed there is a heaven and if there is a
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opportunity as neutrally as possible-by, say, inviting clergy
from all religious denominations. Even this is not entirely reli-
gion-neutral, of course. Some religions are too small to have
clergy; others are theologically opposed to having clergy. Those
religions will inevitably be excluded from clergy-centered legis-
lative prayer programs.313
But a larger problem lies in the temptation to play favo-
rites.314 It is deeply unnatural to let minority believers give
prayers that few people in the audience would want to hear,
unnatural especially for officials whose reelection chances
hinge on how that audience votes later on. Professor Noah
Feldman has argued that courts should abstain from striking
down governmental religious speech in part because "[t]alk can
always be reinterpreted, and more talk can always be added, so
religious speech and symbols need not exclude." 315 But this
maybe ignores the fundamental reality: government usually
does not want to add more talk. Cities and counties have no in-
terest in a legislative prayer format where anyone can speak
about anything. They want legislative prayer because they
want to send a particular message, and to endorse every mes-
sage is really to endorse no message at all. In this sense, legis-
lative prayer always involves exclusion-for it is precisely in
the exclusion of certain types of messages and messengers that
legislative prayer sends its own message and serves its func-
tion.316
For the better part of our country's history, this reality was
buried from view. In the congressional chaplaincies, chaplains
now routinely serve for decades. 317 While there was something
uncomfortable about how the Presbyterian chaplain in Marsh
god that takes a woman's form) hallowed be thy name . . . ."); infra Part IV
(discussing the alternative of a public forum and concluding that it would be
practically impossible because most governments would be unwilling to give
speakers truly free rein over what they would say).
313. See Lund, supra note 44, at 1204 n.168 (noting that Quakers and
Mennonites, lacking ordained clergy, have not participated in the congression-
al chaplaincies).
314. See infra Part III (discussing Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263
(11th Cir. 2008) and Simpson v. Chesterfield County, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir.
2005)).
315. FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 238-39.
316. See Lund, supra note 222, at 52 ("Exclusion and endorsement cannot
be separated; they are flipsides of precisely the same coin").
317. See Lund, supra note 44, at 1202 ("The House of Representatives had




was the sole prayergiver for sixteen years, there was a positive
flipside. For sixteen years, there were no debates about who
would pray. For sixteen years, no one was denied the right to
pray-or at least everyone was denied it equally. More and
more, we have moved away from institutional chaplains toward
rotating chaplaincies. 318 But spreading around the prayer op-
portunity has created even more problems, for the more local
governments open up the prayer opportunity, the more they
have to make difficult decisions about whom to exclude and the
harsher it seems to the excluded speakers. 319 Rotating chap-
laincies also amplify the constitutional problems in yet another
sense. Having private citizens lead prayers makes censorship
both more necessary (in the sense that invited speakers often
do not restrain themselves and are not easily subject to politi-
cal controls) and more troubling (in the sense that their speech
bears more resemblance to quintessentially private speech).
This dynamic led Judge Lucero to conclude that rotating chap-
laincies should be held flatly unconstitutional. 3 2 0 As a matter of
318. See Jeremy G. Mallory, Comment, "An Officer of the House Which
Chooses Him, and Nothing More' How Should Marsh v. Chambers Apply to
Rotating Chaplains?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1428 (2006) (noting a tendency
towards rotating chaplains, especially at lower levels of government).
319. Speaker selection can raise unexpected theological questions. Many
Christian denominations now struggle with whether to ordain gay clergy. See,
e.g., Manya A. Brachear, Lutherans Split over Rule of Celibacy for Gay Clergy,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 2007, at 4, available at 2007 WLNR 14897220; John F.
Burns, Anglicans to Seek Pact to Prevent a Schism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008,
at A6, available at 2008 WLNR 14490241; Paul Jeffrey, Methodists Retain Pol-
icies on Homosexuality, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 3, 2008, at 14, available at
2008 WLNR 11251495. To the extent that we have clergy conducting legisla-
tive prayers, legislatures must wrestle with it as well.
Different factions of the Oklahoma House of Representatives squared off
on the issue last year, after a minister invited to give a legislative prayer
spoke of his partner, Michael. Some representatives moved to have the prayer
stricken from the House Journal; others protested such a move. But both sides
agreed on one thing-for Oklahoma to have gay ministers lead them in prayer
would be a stamp of government approval on the legitimacy of gay clergy. That
approval was what the ministers' supporters wanted, and what his opponents
feared. For coverage of the story, see Michael McNutt, Gay Pastor Irks Critics
Before Offering Prayer, OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 12, 2009, at 14A, available at 2009
WLNR 2867665.
320. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998)
(Lucero, J., concurring) ("It may appear ironic that the Establishment Clause
should endorse official chaplaincies, while proscribing a practice of inviting
prayer volunteers who represent many and varied religious faiths. But though




existing constitutional doctrine, that analysis probably does not
hold much water. But his point is well-taken.
The second question-and the second area of discretion-
relates to the content of legislative prayers. Prayer comes in all
forms, and so there are innumerable lines that a legislature
could draw. A legislature could entirely fix the content of the
prayer; it could specify, for example, that sessions will open
with the Lord's Prayer or the Pledge of Allegiance. 321 A legisla-
ture could put firm requirements on speakers; it could require
them, for example, to avoid sectarian references. A legislature
could offer nonbinding suggestions, allowing speakers to say
what they like while still giving them guidance. Or a legisla-
ture could take no position at all, giving speakers no direction
and unfettered freedom. There are any number of lines to draw,
and any number of ways of interpreting those lines.
Not only will local governments have to draft content limi-
tations, they will have to enforce them as well. This is uncom-
fortable indeed. "Prayers will either have to be submitted for
approval in advance . .. or else assessed on the spot-the gavel
ready-for [inappropriate] content before the amen is spo-
ken."32 2 And legislatures will also have to agree on penalties.
The rules will not enforce themselves-even those speakers
who submit prayers for preapproval might choose to make un-
authorized last-minute changes. Governments will have to de-
cide what happens to a prayergiver who violates the prayer pol-
icies, 32 3 as well as what happens to audience members who dis-
disrupt the prayergiver. 324
321. See, e.g., Roscoe Barnes III, Format Varies for Prayer in Meetings,
PUB. OPINION (Chambersburg, Pa.), July 30, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
14684157 (noting, similarly, that some counties in Pennsylvania open with
prayer while others open with the Pledge of Allegiance or a moment of si-
lence); Faulconer, supra note 12 (noting that as an alternative to audible pray-
ers, two county councils in Virginia open meetings with moments of silence
and one city council recites the Pledge of Allegiance).
322. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1239.
323. See, e.g., Johnson & Adams, supra note 12 (reporting that after an in-
vited clergymember offered a prayer to Jesus Christ in apparent violation of
council protocol, one city councilman called it, "a slap in our face and nothing
we agreed to and is leading us down a road we have not agreed to"). Prayer-
givers have gone off the government-approved script in other contexts as well.
At a recent public school graduation, for example, a valedictorian submitted
her proposed speech to school officials. They marked up her proposal, remov-
ing much of the religious language because they deemed it proselytizing and
inappropriate. At the actual graduation, she departed from what they had ap-
proved, delivering her original speech. Her microphone was cut off in the mid-
dle of her address. The Ninth Circuit rejected her constitutional claims. See
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All of these religious choices come with a price. Whenever
it makes a decision regarding legislative prayer, government
necessarily makes a judgment about religious truth. In deter-
mining who gets to pray, the government decides which religion
or religions are true-or at least which are close enough to the
truth to be worthy of respect. In determining the rules regard-
ing the content of the prayers, the government must make deci-
sions on certain religious propositions. Barring proselytizing
prayers makes sense in an ecumenical world where God sees all
religions as being of equal value and sees none as being worthy
of condemnation. But barring proselytizing prayers makes less
sense in a world where one's neighbors may really be on the
wrong theological course and could potentially suffer lasting
consequences as a result. Requiring gender-neutral language in
prayers will strike some as sound theology and others as New
Age nonsense.325
With each decision, of course, the government sends a mes-
sage-these are the proper religious beliefs, and those who dis-
agree are wrong. This hurt can be conceptualized along a num-
ber of lines. It can be thought of as a denial of equal
citizenship,326 a failure of equal regard, 327 or a rejection of equal
McComb v. Crehan, 320 F. App'x 507 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Lassonde v.
Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (giving
schools significant latitude to censor religious speech in graduation addresses);
Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
324. For an example of a prayer being interrupted at the local level, see
Kay Campbell, Meeting Spiritual Needs, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, May 23, 2008, at
lB, available at 2008 WLNR 13689842 (involving a prayer given by a reve-
rend, who was interrupted by a man who shouted, "I want to proclaim that the
Lord Jesus Christ is Savior," when it became clear that the reverend's prayer
was going to be nonsectarian). For an example at the national level, see Lund,
supra note 44, at 1205-06 (discussing how a Hindu guest chaplain in the U.S.
Senate had his prayer interrupted by several people in the gallery who prayed
over him).
325. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) ("It is a cornerstone
principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 'it is no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the Ameri-
can people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by govern-
ment'. . . ." (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962))).
326. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2005/07/reciprocity-religion-clauses-and-equal.html (July 1, 2005, 10:30 EST)
("I have always believed that at the heart of the jurisprudence of the religion
clauses is the problem of securing equal citizenship in a country whose citizens
have very different and sometimes contradictory beliefs about religion."); see
also Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2349 &
n.109 (1997).
327. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in
LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (Stephen Feldman ed. 2000); see
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political footing.328 None of these are far from Justice
O'Connor's own original formulation over two decades ago,
where she explained how "[e]ndorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adhe-
rents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."329
The price of these religious decisions is also paid, though in
a more subtle and unseen way, by the prayergivers themselves.
Giving a legislative prayer is a real honor. Religious individuals
and groups will be tempted to curry favor with the government
so as to give such prayers more often or to give them on partic-
ularly important occasions. Of course, some speakers will
choose simply not to pray if praying means having to conform
to some objectionable governmental requirements. But others
will conform to the limitations that the government sets, even
at the cost of their religious consciences. And they will conform
even when the government sets no explicit limits-that is, they
will conform to what they believe the government demands or
expects. In one early legislative prayer case, for example, the
city's attorney was asked whether the city council inquired into
the content of a prayer before it was given. He responded, "[a]s
far as I know, we've never asked. There has been no need to
ask. Everybody has been so positive and met the unwritten
guidelines."330 That last line is the killer. In other words, the
city has put such a chilling effect on speech that would-be
speakers engage in self-censorship automatically, without the
government even needing to prompt them. In other First
Amendment contexts, we would find this sort of thing deeply
inconsistent with constitutional values.331 And it probably hap-
also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007).
328. See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establish-
ment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 738 (2006) (explaining "the structural
function of the Establishment Clause" as "put[ting] everyone on an equal polit-
ical footing, regardless of their idiosyncratic religious beliefs or lack of belief").
329. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 320-22 (1996) (elaborating further on what Justice
O'Connor meant).
330. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1242 n.13 (10th Cir.
1998) (Lucero, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
331. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Cost of Agencies: Waters v.
Churchill and the First Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J.
1233, 1263 (1997) ("Uncertainty creates the familiar First Amendment chilling
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pens quite frequently. By nature uncomfortable with setting
explicit limits on prayer, legislatures often choose not to do so.
But because everyone knows there are some boundaries, how-
ever tacit, legislatures push prayergivers into becoming the
censor of their own prayers. This is hardly good for religious
freedom.
Another cost of these religious decisions, albeit of a differ-
ent sort, lies in their effect on the political process. Legislative
prayer has an important temporal dimension. It is an ongoing
process; governments make changes to their legislative prayer
programs as time goes on. In this way, the government's reli-
gious choice today becomes a political issue for tomorrow. And
like all political issues, we can expect citizens to campaign for
certain positions and to vote for candidates that adopt them.
Consider a newspaper article regarding a recent local election
in a small North Carolina town:
Yadkin voters booted out incumbent commissioners Kim Clark Phil-
lips and Joel Cornelius in the Republican primary last week as part of
a backlash over the board's decision to drop sectarian prayer from
meetings, residents said . . .. Of all the changes [the two commission-
ers introduced], last year's vote to limit prayer brought on the strong-
est attacks. . . . Voters began organizing against Phillips and Corne-
lius more than a year ago after a prayer rally in Yadkinville that
drew more than 2,500 people in support of opening meetings with
Christian prayers. "Once we realized that we had some commission-
ers who were going to basically ignore a major conservative voting
bloc, we began from that day to let our voice be heard at the voting,"
said Bruce Freeman, the pastor of Peace Haven Baptist Church. "I
think they paid the price for not heeding the concerns of the voters."
Days before the primary, advertisements ran in newspapers in Elkin
and Yadkinville that promoted Wooten as the only commissioner to
stand up in support of sectarian prayer .... But some people in Yad-
kin County say that voters also had the jail issue on their minds when
they went to the polls. 332
That last line is poignant; the reporter felt it necessary to
add that at least some voters may have considered something
other than the legislative prayer issue in casting their ballots.
There are other similar examples. 333 One recent and notable
effect: To avoid the risk of punishment, speakers stay well within the bounds
of protection."). To his credit, Judge Lucero also found it quite troubling: "[t]he
Attorney's apparent cause for celebration is-to my mind-cause for grave
constitutional concern." Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1242 n.13 (10th Cir. 1998) (Luce-
ro, J., concurring).
332. See Youngquist, supra note 13.
333. See Maheras, supra note 13 ("Area Christian ministers met Monday to
discuss the High Point City Council prayer issue and Tuesday's upcoming
election."); Steadman, supra note 13 (explaining that after a nine-to-one vote
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one took place in California, where a small town was consider-
ing a possible ban on sectarian prayers.334 It received a letter
from a citizens' group threatening to purchase billboard space
on nearby highways and publicly display each council member's
vote as either being "For Jesus" or "Against Jesus."335
We should not be surprised at this. This is the natural and
inevitable result of allowing the government to take religious
positions. And if we feel there is nothing wrong with the gov-
ernment taking religious positions, we should not shy away
from this sort of religiously oriented campaigning and election-
eering. Indeed, we should embrace it. That is, we should em-
brace elections on religion-for, after all, elections are how de-
mocracies make most of their important decisions. Better, one
might say, to have our collective religion chosen by fifty-one
percent of the people rather than forty-nine. So if we share an
intuition that there is something troubling in the above exam-
ples, what we share must be the intuition that government
should not be taking positions on religious questions. 336 Doug-
las Laycock has put it best:
Conceding government power to lead religious opinion implies the le-
gitimacy of voting and campaigning on religious propositions, because
voting and campaigning are how democracies choose positions for
their governments to take. But voting on the truth of religious propo-
sitions is utterly inconsistent with committing religious faith to indi-
vidual choices and commitments.337
Having said all this, the fights over the Ten Command-
ments and the Pledge of Allegiance offer a nice contrast. There
the government has significantly less discretion. 338 Most impor-
to allow only nonsectarian prayers, one minister "critical of the council vote,
ended his comments with a political threat . . . . 'We're going to remember in
2008,"' which was followed by a "loud standing ovation").
334. See Maggie Creamer, Group Threatens to Display on Billboards How
Council Members Vote on Invocation, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 2009.
335. See id.
336. Even the right side of the Court has expressed this intuition; everyone
seems to share a visceral discomfort with elections on religion. See Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 321 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("[I]t is possible that the students might vote not to have a pregame speak-
er .... [or would focus] on public speaking ability or social popularity. And if
student campaigning did begin to focus on prayer, the school might decide to
implement reasonable campaign restrictions."). Chief Justice Rehnquist's last
line is telling; if elections on religion are no more troubling than elections on
public speaking ability or social popularity, there would be no need for cam-
paign restrictions.
337. Laycock, supra note 54, at 230.
338. The government's discretion over Ten Commandments displays is
narrowed by the unusual split decision in McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky.,
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tant is that the government has virtually no discretion over the
religious content; no one wants to change the text of the Ten
Commandments or rewrite the Pledge. So a city council may
debate whether to adopt or uproot a Ten Commandments dis-
play; a school board may argue as to whether to implement or
discard the Pledge of Allegiance in its classrooms. 339 But these
are more like simple thumbs-up, thumbs-down votes. There is
less debate about the relative merits or demerits of various
theological statements or religious groups. 340 And there are also
no fights over who gets to send the message. The message in a
Ten Commandment display is delivered by no one in particular;
it is seen as a general message by the undifferentiated govern-
ment.341 The Pledge is usually led by a teacher, but the teacher
545 U.S. 844 (2005) and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). These two
cases together suggest that older Ten Commandments displays are constitu-
tional, but that the government cannot put up new ones. Thus, local govern-
ments seem to have discretion to take Ten Commandment displays down, but
not to put them up.
339. Id.
340. But see supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (noting there is
some potential for disagreement between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews,
who, for example, have different versions of the Ten Commandments). Some-
times governments can make perhaps unfortunate decisions about content.
One example involves an Oklahoma county deciding to put up a Ten Com-
mandments display on a courthouse lawn, and entrusting the whole process to
a private citizen (Michael Bush):
After receiving approval from the Board, Mr. Bush raised the neces-
sary funds through religious groups in the community. With the as-
sistance of a friend, Mr. Bush decided on the wording of the Ten
Commandments to appear on the Monument, condensing and pa-
raphrasing from the King James Version of the Bible. At some point
in the process of designing the Monument, Mr. Bush decided to in-
clude the Mayflower Compact as well. As it relates to the Ten Com-
mandments, the Board did not review or approve Mr. Bush's design of
the Monument or the version of the Ten Commandments that he se-
lected to be inscribed on it. With regard to the Mayflower Compact,
the Board apparently was not apprised of Mr. Bush's plan to add it to
the Monument and did not authorize him to do so.
Green v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 568 F.3d 784, 790-91 (10th Cir. 2009). The district
court called Bush's Ten Commandments "a butchered paraphrase of the KJV
[King James Version]." Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273,
1278 (E.D. Okla. 2006). The plaintiff suggested that the end result was a "uni-
quely Christian" Ten Commandments monument lacking any ecumenical
qualities. See Green, 568 F.3d at 790 n.3.
341. This perception is not necessarily true-many of the litigated Ten
Commandments cases involve displays that were given to the government by
the Fraternal Order of Eagles. See Laycock, supra note 54, at 236-37 ("Many
of these monuments were donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in con-
junction with promotions of Cecil B. DeMille's 1956 movie, The Ten Com-
mandments."). But the point is that the government did not put up the Ten
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is chosen separately on religion-neutral criteria. Perhaps that
could change; one could imagine a school board inviting a select
group of clergy into the public schools to lead the Pledge. But so
far that has not happened.
This is not to minimize the disputes that have developed
over the Pledge and over the Ten Commandments. Those reli-
gious messages intrinsically impart the same sort of harm Jus-
tice O'Connor warned about.342 And, even after Newdow, Van
Orden, and McCreary County, there are some live issueS343 and
some danger that religious issues might become political foot-
balls. 344
Yet the problem with legislative prayer runs deeper-
again, precisely because legislative prayer involves more dis-
cretion and more choice. 345 And an important aspect to this is
that the problems with legislative prayer are in some ways in-
tractable. As long as legislative prayer is constitutionally per-
missible, it will remain a divisive political issue, no matter how
the Supreme Court resolves the second-order constitutional
questions relating to how it can be conducted. Assume, for ex-
ample, that the Supreme Court ends all the constitutional liti-
gation with a simple holding that no one-neither speakers nor
listeners-has any constitutional rights in the matter. Legisla-
tures can have legislative prayer programs as they see fit. Such
Commandments at the behest of some religious group in a way that would
suggest government favoritism for the religious views of that particular group.
342. See supra note 329 and accompanying text (warning that endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders).
343. See, e.g., Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1368-69 (S.D.
Fla. 2006) (striking down a Florida statute requiring that students get paren-
tal permission before being able to opt out of the Pledge); see also Circle Sch. v.
Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 183 (3d Cir. 2004) (same regarding Pennsylvania's sta-
tute). The Court said long ago that students could not be forced to say the
Pledge. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670-71 (1943).
But the issue of parental permission remains.
344. See Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (D.
Colo. 2006) (involving a claim by an elected town official who claims he was
recalled for failing to support the religious aspects of the Pledge of Allegiance).
345. In a way, this discussion parallels Justice O'Connor's opinion in the
Newdow case. There O'Connor gave four factors to differentiate between con-
stitutional ceremonial deism and unconstitutional endorsements of religion:
the "history and ubiquity" of the government's religious statement, the "ab-
sence of worship or prayer," the "absence of reference to particular religion,"
and the "minimal religious content" of the statement. See Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37-44 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Though Justice O'Connor had no occasion to phrase it this way, her opinion
also suggests that the problem is governmental discretion; when her four fac-
tors are met, government will have very little discretion indeed.
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a holding would put a quick end to all the constitutional litiga-
tion regarding legislative prayer. But this would simply move
the issues from the courts back into the political branches. Lis-
teners and speakers would continue to face the same harms
that they currently do-and the political fight over legislative
prayer would become only more heated.
CONCLUSION
[H]istory tells us that legislative prayers do not represent
any realistic potential for the kind of strife the Establishment
Clause was intended to prevent, because no such strife has ever
surfaced as a result thereof.
-Petitioners' Brief in Marsh v. Chambers346
How different those words seem a generation later. Twen-
ty-five years of history have demonstrated, better than any dis-
sent ever could, the ways in which legislative prayer consti-
tutes an establishment of religion. The willingness of the people
to fight tooth-and-nail for control over legislative prayer has
given us the most perfect proof of its character as a religious es-
tablishment.
In deciding Marsh twenty-five years ago, the Court could
not have foreseen the path legislative prayer would take. It
could not have predicted the battles, both constitutional and po-
litical, that legislative prayer would create. The root of the
problem lies in the extensive set of religious choices that legis-
lative prayer requires the government to make. Each choice
marginalizes the religious segment that disagrees with it; each
choice invites a struggle for future control of it; each choice
furthers religious division along political lines.
Marsh has committed us to a second-best theory of reli-
gious liberty. It would be better if it were overruled. But as long
as Marsh lives, there will be the question of how to best provide
for religious liberty within its framework. Maximizing the li-
berty comes from minimizing the harms, and minimizing the
harms comes from minimizing the scope of the government's re-
ligious choices. That is the chief benefit of the nonsectarian and
impermissible motive restrictions; they cabin the most danger-
ous aspects of governmental discretion.
346. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 16, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983) (No. 82-23) (on file with author).
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Of course, unless Marsh is overruled completely, the prob-
lems associated with legislative prayer will not disappear. Con-
stitutional restrictions on legislative prayer's operation may
narrow some of the government's discretion, but there will al-
ways be issues to fight about. The larger message of these legis-
lative prayer cases is that ostensibly benign religious endorse-
ments can grow to have real meaning and real power, and they
can be a real force for religious division in our society. Religious
endorsements that initially seem innocuous can grow into
something quite pernicious. The costs of minor religious en-
dorsements are real. And in the years to come when the Court
again considers whether to adhere to the neutrality principle
(or how far to depart from it), those costs must be kept in mind.
